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Abstract
To Destroy or to Preserve: Urban Renewal and the Legal Foundation of Historic District Zoning
By: Andrew Eugene Tarne, J.D., B.A.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban
and Regional Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014.
Major Director: Dr. I-Shian Suen, Chair, Urban and Regional Studies

Historic preservation and urban renewal are often thought to be polar opposites. Where
one seeks to preserve, the other generally seeks to destroy in order to rebuild. While the
programs appear on the surface to be in opposition, this Thesis seeks to demonstrate that there is
a fundamental connection between the underlying legal principles of historic zoning and urban
renewal. To that end, the jurisprudence involving historic zoning and aesthetic regulations before
and after the seminal urban renewal case of Berman v. Parker has been collected and analyzed.
This analysis revealed that courts were hesitant to support aesthetic, and by extension
would have been unlikely to support historic zoning, prior to the Supreme Court’s validation of
urban renewal programs in Berman. For example, in 1949 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
stated that specifically stated that a zoning regulation cannot be enacted solely to preserve the
beauty of a community. In Berman, however, the United States Supreme Court justified urban
renewal on the basis that governments should be able to condemn and regulate property for the
creation of a more attractive community.
An analysis of the jurisprudence following Berman indicated that courts were more likely
to uphold aesthetic or historic zoning ordinances. For example, in a 1955 opinion, the Supreme
v

Court of Massachusetts cited Berman and stated that, because construction of aesthetically or
historically incompatible structures could destroy the historic character of a town, historic zoning
ordinances fell within the scope of the police power. In short, the cases identified by this Thesis
ultimately indicated that Berman had an impact on the acceptance of aesthetic and historic
zoning. Therefore, they suggest that the programs of historic zoning and urban renewal, while
seemingly in opposition, share fundamental legal roots.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a divided decision, generally
recognized the validity of historic preservation ordinances in the landmark case Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.1 Since 1978, the historic preservation movement in the
United States has continued to grow. Currently, a number of laws, regulations, and policies at the
federal, state, and local levels affect millions of properties across the nation.
Government managed historic preservation began with the admirable intention of
preserving “the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation . . . as a living part of our
community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American
people.”2 With a growing number of laws and designated historic districts, however, some
property owners and residents have grown concerned that historic preservation efforts may harm
both their individual interests and their larger communities.3 Indeed, many of those affected by
historic preservation laws have reason to be concerned. Within urban environments nationwide, a
multitude of neighborhoods have been designated as historic by government at all levels.4 Many
residents of these neighborhoods still have very real memories of an earlier government program
that sought to create better neighborhoods and cities, urban renewal. Residents fear that historic

1

438 U.S. 104 (1978). The primary challenge to the New York City Landmark
Ordinance was that, as applied to Plaintiff’s property, it constituted a takings requiring just
compensation. In reaching the conclusion that the ordinance did not amount to a takings, the
majority generally recognized the validity of historic zoning and landmark designation. See infra
notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
2
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006).
3
See, e.g., Jess R. Phelps, Moving Beyond Preservation Paralysis? Evaluating PostRegulatory Alternatives for Twenty-First Century Preservation, 37 VT. L. REV. 113, 113 (2012).
4
See, e.g., Ryan Howell, note, Throw the “Bums” Out? A Discussion of the Effects of
Historic Preservation Statutes on Low-Income Households Through the Process of Urban
Gentrification in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541, 545-46 (2008)
(discussing historic preservation ordinances).
1

preservation laws will lead to the same pain of displacement felt by communities affected by
Twentieth Century urban renewal programs.5 Indeed, some scholars have even noted that
government managed historic preservation ultimately has its roots in mid-century urban
renewal.6 Others take a different, though not inherently contradictory, approach, arguing that
historic preservation, as a movement, grew from the opposition to mid-century interventionist,
demolition based urban renewal tactics.7
This Thesis will expand on current scholarship regarding the links between historic
preservation and urban renewal. It will begin by exploring the roots of mid-century urban
renewal programs and of historic preservation programs. The focus will then turn to a direct
analysis of the fundamental legal similarities of urban renewal and historic preservation as
developed in case law. Specifically, this Thesis will compare historic preservation and aesthetic
regulation cases prior to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal Urban Renewal decision in
Berman v. Parker to historic preservation cases following that decision. This approach will be
used to help determine the effect that the Berman decision had on the legal status of historic
preservation laws. This Thesis hopes to contribute to the existing scholarship by outlining in

5

See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 513-14 (1981) (“Low-income interest associations
such as the National Urban Coalition fear that rehabilitation in historic districts, leading to steep
rent increases, will force low-income tenants to leave their old neighborhoods, without even the
benefit of the Uniform Relocation Act payments that once assisted those displaced by urban
renewal projects . . . .”).
6
See Stephanie R. Ryberg, Historic Preservation’s Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation
and Planning in Midcentury Pennsylvania, 39 J. URBAN HISTORY 193, 194 (2013) (arguing that
mid-century Philadelphia planners adopted plans that preserved buildings “not based on a sense
of historic value, but rather a pragmatic desire to ease plan implementation”); see also Rose,
supra note 5, at 509 (“The 1950s and early 1960s urban renewal plans for preservation have a
continuing influence in historic district planning.”).
7
See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH (1966).
2

detail the field of historic preservation jurisprudence before and after Berman. Such an outline
will aid in determining whether the legal foundations of urban renewal and historic preservation
are inextricably linked. 8 Finally, this Thesis briefly suggests alternatives to traditional historic
preservation zoning that could deliver similar preservationist results while protecting residents
and property owners from the potential downsides of zoning based approaches.

8

As used in this Thesis, the term “urban renewal” refers specifically to the renewal
programs of the mid twentieth century characterized by the condemnation and demolition of
properties later redeveloped through public-private partnerships. See infra notes 14-26 and
accompanying text. Such programs were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). This Thesis is mostly concerned with the legal relationship
between historic preservation and urban renewal at the local level. That is, the primary topic
discussed is the concept of the police power and general welfare as used to justify both local
urban renewal programs and local historic zoning ordinances.
3

II.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Urban renewal and historic preservation programs are frequently considered to be polar
opposites.9 One seeks to raze and rebuild while the other seeks to preserve. The traditional
narrative holds that preservation movements gained traction and support as a result of “heavyhanded” urban renewal programs.10 While the historic preservation movement may have gained
much ground following the implementation, and often failure, of mid-century urban renewal
efforts, the traditional narrative for most parts fails to recognize the overlapping legal similarities
between the programs and the fact that private historic preservation efforts began in the United
States decades before the implementation of the urban renewal programs.
Direct comparative analyses between the two programs, are few; however, work has been
undertaken to demonstrate that the traditional narrative cannot explain the whole story. For
example, Professor Ryberg has argued that historic preservation was but one tool used by
planners undertaking urban renewal.11 Her research has showed that planners in Philadelphia
were faced with market constraints and so had to carefully choose when to tear down and when

9

“Traditional histories on mid-Twentieth Century urban renewal paint a relatively blackand-white picture One of the most powerful and entrenched narratives about the era is that
demolition prevailed over preservation. Emanating out of this belief, many scholars and
practitioners argue that the modern preservation profession developed in direct response to the
destructive policies and practices of midcentury city planning.” Ryberg, supra note 6, at 193.
10
Eugenie Ladner Birch & Douglad Roby, The Planner and the Preservationist: An
Uneasy Alliance, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 194, 199 (1984). Birch and Roby do note that there
were successful collaborations between urban renewal and preservation, for example in
Philadelphia, but that they “remained a minor part of the total project costs of the Philadelphia
[renewal] program.” Id. at 198.
11
See Ryberg, supra note 6.
4

to preserve.12 Although their preservation of structures was not based on a sense of historic
value, they consciously used historic preservation as a tool for urban renewal.13
Still, the history of both urban renewal and historic zoning is complicated and worth
developing before this Thesis proceeds with an analysis of the legal similarities between the two
regimes. This review will focus on the history behind each program, the legislative origins of the
programs, the goals for the programs, and both positive and negative criticism of the programs.
Such a review will help to frame the discussion in Chapter Six of jurisprudence relating to each
program.
A. Urban Renewal
Broadly stated, urban renewal is a systematic program of redeveloping an urban system
that has fallen into decay.14 Typically, the program is undertaken as a partnership between public
agencies and the private sector.15 While urban renewal programs had existed in various forms as
early as the late Nineteenth Century, the seminal programs in the United States were undertaken
during the mid-Twentieth Century.16 These urban renewal programs were based in large part on
trust in the proficiency of professional planners and government officials.17 The “physical
amelioration” of the urban environment was viewed as the solution to various ills that had

12

See id. at 194.
Id.
14
See,e.g., Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB.
LAW. 423 (2010).
15
Stacey A. Sutton, Urban Revitalization in the United States: Policies and Practices,
UNITED STATES URBAN REVITALIZATION RESEARCH PROJECT (2008).
16
See id. at 27-29.
17
Id. at 28 (“There was a general confidence in government, particularly in its ability to
stimulate a weak economy through investment and public works.”).
13
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befallen America’s major urban centers.18 As Altshuler and Luberoff note, urban leaders
believed that only “radical surgery” would stem the “death spiral” of their cities.19 This radical
surgery took the form of government sponsored redevelopment plans. Plans were proposed and
adopted by city officials in a centralized, rational style of planning.20
i.

Brief History

In the United States, Urban Renewal arose in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Century as a tool to combat a perceived deterioration in the urban environment.21 Urban renewal
continues to this day in various forms, notably through economic development programs.22 The
specific term “urban renewal,” however, most usually invokes the large scale, government
sponsored “slum clearance” programs undertaken during the middle of the Twentieth Century. In
this form, Urban Renewal was undertaken by local governments which received funding from
the federal government.23
The tool used by local governments to accomplish urban renewal was that of eminent
domain. The procedure was relatively straightforward. A locality would simply condemn areas
that it deemed blighted and then would either develop the land itself or transfer the land to a

18

Id.
ALAN A. ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGAPROJECTS: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF
URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT 14 (2003).
20
See Sutton, supra note 15, at 27; see also MICAHEL P. BROOKS, PLANNING THEORY FOR
PRACTITIONERS 81-95 (AICP 2003) (discussing the nature of the centralized rationality planning
paradigm).
21
See Lavine, supra note 14 (discussing the City Beautiful movement in Washington
D.C.); see also Sutton, supra note 15, at 23-25 (discussing attention paid to the deterioration of
the built environment during the early twentieth century).
22
See Lavine, supra note 14. (discussing the connection between urban renewal and the
justification for economic development in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
23
See Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
443, 444-45 (2000); see also Sutton, supra note 15, at 23.
19
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private party for development.24 Historically, the application of eminent domain had been limited
to scenarios in which the government condemned property and then put it to a public use, such as
a government building or a park.25 The use of eminent domain for urban renewal, however,
raised the problem that the land condemned was not actually being physically used by the
government.26
ii.

Goals and Expectations

The Urban Renewal programs undertaken in the mid twentieth century under federal
tutelage did not necessarily set out to damage the physical and sociological fabric of America’s
cities through the destruction of the traditional built environment and the displacement of
residents. Rather, the urban renewal programs seemed to have been undertaken with the support
of cities and their disadvantaged residents in mind.27 For example, the Federal Housing Act of

24

Sutton, supra note 15, at 25 (“Government would play a central role by using eminent
domain to assembly the land and provide ancillary infrastructure improvements . . . . The land
would then be turned over to private developers for rebuilding.”). See, e.g., District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 760 (1946) (Washington D.C.’s urban renewal program).
25
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how the original meaning of the Public Use Clause was that government
could take property only when it actually uses that property or gives the public a right to use it).
26
See ALTSHULER & LUBEROFF, supra note 19, at 14-15 (noting how using eminent
domain to this end a few years earlier would have “doubtless” been found unconstitutional). A
full analysis of the history behind the doctrine of “public use” and “public purpose” is beyond
the scope of this Thesis. However, the analysis contained herein regarding the scope of the police
power and the general welfare is closely related to the evolution of the understanding of public
use.
27
See Teaford, supra note 23, at 444 (discussing how a diverse coalition backed Title I of
the Housing Act of 1949, especially social welfare leaders and advocates of low and moderate
income housing who believed urban renewal would “better the living conditions of the poor”).
7

1949, which made available federal funds for local renewal projects, provided that there be “a
feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced from the project area.”28
Urban renewal programs were undertaken with the objective of restoring cities that had
fallen into decay.29 Moreover, the programs were often undertaken with the express purpose of
assisting impoverished city residents living in, what were deemed, unsanitary conditions.30 For
example, dwellings on Vinegar Hill in Charlottesville, Virginia, largely were light wooden
structures that lacked indoor plumbing and other modern sanitary features.31 By clearing away
these older “blighted” units, urban renewal would “increase the stock of decent, affordable
dwelling in the central cities.”32 In short, advocates hoped that through urban renewal and
“[w]ith the aid of Uncle Sam, cities [would be] cleansed of their ugly past and reclothed in the
latest modern attire.”33
iii.

Positive Outcomes and Support

Admittedly, urban renewal programs did generate some positive outcomes, albeit through
mechanisms harmful to many. For example, urban renewal did spur the removal of property that,

28

Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 105(c), 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949).
See Sutton, supra note 15, at 23-29; ALTSHULER & LUBEROFF, supra note 19, at 14.
30
See Quintin Johnstone, Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301, 30106 (1958) (discussing how blight harms cities and residents alike, and arguing that decent low
income housing can combat blight); Lavine, supra note 14 (discussing the use of federal funding
and of renewal programs to clear slums and construct public housing); Teaford, supra note 23, at
444 (discussing how urban renewal was seen as a method to better the living conditions of the
poor).
31
See JAMES ROBERT SAUNDERS & RENAE NADINE SHACKLEFORD, URBAN RENEWAL AND
THE END OF BLACK CULTURE IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 3 (2005) (noting the condition of
Vinegar Hill prior to urban renewal).
32
Teaford, supra note 23, at 444.
33
Id. at 443.
29

8

by many accounts, was actually subpar.34 Under the belief that blight bred blight, cities cleared
“substandard” housing in order to provide the opportunity for the emergence of a more modern,
healthy urban environment for city residents.35
Teaford notes several successful developments that resulted from urban renewal.
Following renewal, Baltimore’s Charles Center employed five thousand more individuals and tax
receipts quadrupled, as compared to before renewal.36 The Lincoln Center project in New York
helped to transform the Upper West Side of Manhattan into a thriving neighborhood.37
Philadelphia’s Society Hill project resulted in a unique combination of new structures and
rehabilitation of existing historic houses.38 As such, property tax receipts for the city increased
from $454,000 annually to $2.47 million annually.39 Similarly, Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood
project utilized a combination of destruction and rehabilitation to preserve the health of the
University of Chicago area.40 Despite the general success of these projects, Teaford notes that
they were often accompanied by the downsides of displacement and removal of minority and low
income residents.41

34

See Johnstone, supra note 30, at 301-05 (discussing blight).
See id. at 301-06 (arguing that the construction of low-income housing “tends to
prevent blight”); see also Teaford, supra note 23, at 443-45.
36
Teaford, supra note 23, at 451.
37
Id. at 451-52.
38
Id. at 452.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 452-53.
41
Id. at 451-54.
35

9

iv.

Negative Outcomes and Criticisms

The radical surgery of urban renewal usually took the form of blight clearing through the
exercise of eminent domain.42 In the process, large numbers of individuals were displaced as city
governments condemned privately owned property and transferred it to either city redevelopment
authorities or private developers.43 As Lavine notes, “[t]he social impacts of urban renewal were
huge, as lower class and often minority families were moved out of center cities to make room
for uses that would generate higher tax revenues.”44 Moreover, the effect of Urban Renewal on
minorities was often so pronounced that the programs were dubbed “negro removal.”45For
example, Saunders and Shackleford note how the urban renewal project undertaken by
Charlottesville, Virginia to modernize Vinegar Hill destroyed a vibrant minority community. 46
The program caused the displacement of hundreds of individuals and the disruption of an
existing, thriving business community.47Moreover, although demolition had been completed by
1965, renewal efforts were still incomplete nearly twenty years later. 48
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States directly addressed urban renewal
programs utilizing eminent domain and declared them legal in Berman v. Parker.49 As professor
Pritchett has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Berman affected a dramatic expansion in
the government’s powers of eminent domain and provided judicial legitimation for urban

42

See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 15, at 25
See id. at 30 (noting that, between 1956 and 1972, 3.8 million residents were displaced
by urban renewal and urban freeway construction); Teaford, supra note 23, at 445-51 (discussing
the displacement caused by urban renewal programs).
44
See Lavine, supra note 14.
45
See Sutton, supra note 15, at 30 (discussing the focus and effects of urban renewal and
urban freeway construction on black neighborhoods).
46
See SAUNDERS & SHACKLEFORD, supra note 31, at 1-6.
47
Id. at 3-4.
48
Id. at 3-5 (“As late as 1982 seven acres of the Hill remained vacant.”).
49
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
43

10

renewal efforts.”50 The Court’s approval of urban renewal increasingly allowed local
governments to widely exercise eminent domain to condemn and transfer private property “in the
name of housing, commercial, or industrial development.”51 Therefore, in addition to
displacement, the practice and affirmation of urban renewal had the effect of eroding the
protections of private property rights.52
In short, the lasting legacy of urban renewal, despite any successes, is largely one of
failure. Jacobs and Paulsen note that some “see this period as one in which planners destroyed
vibrant urban communities, facilitated suburban sprawl, and caused protests, freeway revolts,
racial animosity, and an anti-planning backlask that persists to today.”53 Indeed, the failures of
urban renewal actively continue to this day in the form of new economic development urban
renewal programs. For example, in the year 2000, the City of New London, Connecticut,
undertook an economic development program utilizing eminent domain to condemn a large
section of water front property and transfer it to a private developer.54 However, as of February
2014, that property has remained largely vacant and undeveloped.55

50

Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE LAW & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003).
51
Id. at 48.
52
See Harvey M. Jacobs & Kurt Paulsen, Property Rights The Neglected Theme of 20thCentury Planning, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 134, 137-38 (2009) (discussing the growing power of
central planning in the mid-twentieth century).
53
Id.
54
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.469 (2005).
55
See Charlotte Allen, ‘Kelo’ Revisited, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 10, 2014; Alec Torres,
Nine Years after Kelo, the Seized Land is Empty, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 5, 2014, 6:00 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370441/nine-years-after-kelo-seized-land-empty-alectorres.
.
11

B. Historic Preservation
This Thesis is primarily concerned with historic preservation through municipally
enacted historic zoning ordinances. These ordinances are enacted by local governments and
serve to preserve the historic character of a neighborhood by prohibiting demolition,
construction, repair, or alteration without approval from the city government.56
i.

Brief History

Historic preservation, generally, can be roughly divided into three schools of thought:
“Monumentalism, Aestheticism, and Revitalization.”57 In the United States, Monumentalism
focuses primarily on the protection and preservation of sites that are deemed important to the
history and fabric of the early Republic and its heroes, especially the Founding Fathers. 58
Monumentalism has at its core a desire to promote the importance of historical principles in the
abstract. Historically, Monumentalism was usually undertaken by private organizations.59
Aestheticism focuses on the preservation of physical objects and places.60 In other words,
Aestheticism regarded the physical form of structures, whether monumental or vernacular, as
important in and of itself. Aestheticism, therefore, differs from Monumentalism in that
Monumentalism can be ambivalent as to the preservation of an actual historic structure.61
Moreover, Aestheticism relied more on government involvement than Monumentalism. As

56

See, e.g., CITY OF RICHMOND, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 114, § 114-930 to -930.9
(2014) (regulations for the City of Richmond’s Old and Historic Districts).
57
Todd Schneider, note, From Monuments to Urban Renewal: How Different
Philosophies of Historic Preservation Impact the Poor, 8 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 257,
258 (2001).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 259 (noting that the “first successful large-scale preservation battle” was waged
by the Mount Vernon Ladies Association).
60
Id. at 260.
61
See id. at 259.
12

Schneider notes, Aestheticism became increasingly popular in the early twentieth century and led
to the designation of local historic districts by municipal governments.62
Revitalization grew out of the foundations of Aestheticism. Where Aestheticism focused
on the aesthetics of individual structures or neighborhoods as a public good worthy of
preservation and protection, Revitalization saw the larger urban system as a good that needed
protection.63 In large part, revitalization efforts focused on the good created by a traditional city
system of mixed use districts and varied physical and social fabrics.64 Rypkema takes a similar
approach and argues that preserving and revitalizing older structures serves a public good by
providing affordable housing and more-walkable environments.65 Revitalization, therefore,
represents a shift in historic preservation. Rather than focusing strictly on the historic character
of a structure or site, Revitalization, at least in part, focuses on planning for an urban system’s
future based on methods that worked in the past.66 In this way, revitalization efforts can be
viewed as a tool of urban renewal programs.67 Indeed, professor Ryberg has argued that midTwentieth Century urban renewal programs selectively utilized preservation and Revitalization
as a means to achieve successful renewal with limited resources.68
Professor Byrne has argued a similar position by noting that historic preservation efforts
“frustrate central control of decisionmaking and megaprojects and shield smaller-scaled, diffused

62

Id. at 261.
See id. at 261, 266-67.
64
Id. at 261.
65
Donovan D. Rypkema, Historic Preservation and Affordable Housing: The Missed
Connection (2002).
66
See Schneider, supra note 57, at 260-61.
67
Id.
68
See Ryberg, supra note 6, at 193-97.
63

13

redevelopment [; thus] elevat[ing] community and authenticity.69 Again, the uses of preservation
law seem to have moved away from strictly preserving the built environment towards the broader
goal of “mak[ing] the modern city hospitable for contemporary life.”70
ii.

Goals and Expectations

Succinctly stated, the broad objective of historic preservation is to preserve the built
environments in order to secure the cultural history of the nation.71 The benefits of historic
preservation are often described in intangible terms such as the enhancement of “quality of life
for people”72 and the preservation “of cultural meaning and identity.”73 In other words, historic
preservation serves as a link to the past, in order to provide a cultural base for the future.74
Moreover, historic zoning in particular, as a tool of historic preservation, is seen as a way for
governments to provide tangible benefits to a community through maintained or increased
property values as well as municipal income generated through tourism.75 Professor Byrne has
noted that “[l]ocalities market themselves to developers and visitors by touting their historic

69

J. Peter Byrne, Historic Preservation and its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the
Contemporary Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON LAW REV.
665, 688 (2012).
70
Id. at 687.
71
See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (2006).
72
Frank B. Gilbert, Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 312
(1971) (quoting Robert Stipe, Address at the 1971 Conference on Preservation Law ( May 1,
1971)); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978)
(quoting Gilbert).
73
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation of Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 796 (2009) (arguing that the benefits of historic structures are essential to
cultural meaning and identity, and therefore that private owners should be prevented from tearing
down historic structures); see also Byrne, supra note 69, at 676-77 (discussing Alexander’s
argument) (“The cultural heritage conveyed by a community’s historic buildings is a public
good, the value of which is not fully internalized in private property rights.”).
74
See 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4).
75
See, e.g., Howell, supra note 4, at 550 (discussing the link between the preservation of
historic buildings, economic revitalization, and tourism).
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resources. But most importantly, local historic preservation laws regulate the demolition and
alteration of numerous designated historic buildings and sites within many of the most dynamic
urban real estate markets [across the country].”76
iii.

Positive Outcomes and Support

The most obvious positive effect of historic preservation through zoning is that it serves
to preserve historic structures and environments, many of which are aesthetically pleasing. While
this outcome is tangible and subjective, it is generally considered positive.77 The preservation of
such districts and structures has been recognized as having benefit to the community at large,
helping to ground citizens in a sense of time and place. 78 Moreover, these historic districts are
often more human scaled than modern developments.79 Therefore, their preservation helps to
preserve a walkable urban environment.80
Additionally, Rypkema has noted many economic benefits to historic preservation
generally. Leaving aside displacement concerns, the designation of properties as historic
generally helps to maintain or raise property values, seemingly because historic districts are
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See Byrne, supra note 69, at 665-66.
See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game”: The Possibility of
Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 733, 734 (1997) (“The various benefits attributed to the physical, built environment
include the cultivation of community solidarity and stability, the advancement of individuals’
orientation and identity, and the encouragement of aesthetic excellence as well as enjoyment.”).
78
See id.
79
See Rypkema, supra note 65, at 13 (comparing historic neighborhoods to new urban
forms and concluding that existing historic neighborhoods are preferable even to new urbanism,
because historic neighborhoods are “real urbanism”).
80
See id. at 7-8 (discussing the proximity of historic housing to schools, jobs, and public
transit).
77
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desirable areas to live.81 Moreover, Rypkema has noted that rehabilitation can often be more
cost-effective than new construction.82 The cost effectiveness of rehabilitation can be
compounded by the availability of tax abatement or tax credits generally available to historic
rehabilitation projects.83 Moreover, it has been argued that rehabilitation and reuse are the
“greenest” form of construction.84
iv.

Negative Outcomes and Criticisms

Perhaps the greatest criticism of historic zoning is that it results in gentrification and
displacement.85 Gentrification, in and of itself, may not be negative, however, it is closely linked
with displacement, which generally is considered negative.86 Displacement is considered to
occur when individuals involuntarily relocate due to rising rents, taxes, cost of ownership, or
even forced government action.87 Historic zoning has also seen general resistance from
neighborhood associations.88 Residents fear that historic preservation laws will lead to the same
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See Donovan D. Rypkema, The (Economic Value) of National Register Listing, 25
CULTURAL RESOURCE MGMT. 6 (2002); see also Howell, supra note 4, at 551.
82
See Rypkema, supra note 65, at 10.
83
See id. at 10-12, 15-16.
84
See NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE GREENEST BUILDING:
QUANTIFYING THE ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE OF BUILDING REUSE 84 (2011).
85
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405 (2003)
(noting that historic preservation laws are often blamed for setting gentrification in motion, but
ultimately arguing that that perception is flawed).
86
See generally id. at 410-15 (“The federal government has taken the view that
displacement from gentrification has never been a serious problem. Advocates for the poor, on
the other hand, have long argued that displacement occurs on a large scale and have called for
government action to protect low-income residents.”).
87
See id. at 412 (discussing the causes of displacement within the gentrification context);
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing displacement caused by urban renewal).
88
See Phelps, supra note 3, at 113 (“Preservationists are increasingly aware of a growing
reluctance in many communities against the formation of new local historic districts (LHDs) or
other forms of local regulatory preservation restrictions.”).
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pain of displacement felt by communities affected by Twentieth Century urban renewal
programs.89
Another concern regarding historic zoning is that it is fundamentally based on subjective
considerations. The determination of the cultural, historic, or aesthetic value of a structure or
district is something over which reasonable people may disagree, and therefore it is difficult to
apply standards governing the administration of historic zoning.90
Historic zoning laws can also be considered to adversely affect certain First Amendment
rights.91 It has been suggested that historic zoning ordinances could abridge First Amendment
rights by prohibiting landowners from erecting signs or commissioning art on the exterior of
their buildings.92
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See Rose, supra note 5 at 513-14.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.1 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the subjective nature of the New York landmark
preservation ordinance); see also Eric J. Remington, Do Subjective Preservation Standards
Trump Objective Zoning Standards?, 7 LAND USE Q. 7, 7-8 (2012) (discussing subjective and
objective preservation language in North Carolina law); cf. Eleanor Gorski, Regulating New
Construction in Historic Districts: Contemporary Design, The ALLIANCE REVIEW, March/April
2011, at 17-18 (discussing the problems associated with providing for new, contemporary styles
of design in historic districts); David Payne, Charleston Contradictions: A Case Study of
Historic Preservation Theories and Policies (Jan. 1, 2013) (Ph.d. dissertation, Clemson
University), available at
http://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2140&context=all_dissertations,
(generally discussing the competing theories as to the subjective nature of design and how that
nature complicates preservation decision-making); John King, Re-evaluating S.F. Historic
Preservation Framework, SFGATE (May 1, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/place/article/Re-evaluating-S-F-historic-preservationframework-2373053.php (“The dilemma with preservation today is that in an ever-moresubjective world, true believers - or politically adroit cynics - can make the case for almost
anything.”).
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Timothy L. Binetti, note, Culture Club or the Clash? Historic Preservation, Aesthetic
Uniformity and Artistic Freedom, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 313 passim
(2003).
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Id.
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Finally, historic zoning has been noted to lead to “pre-emptive demolition.” Pre-emptive
demolition occurs when a building owner discovers that a city is considering historical
designation for a building, and then preemptively takes measures to ensure that designation does
not occur. 93 These measures can range from alterations to remove historic features from the
structure to demolition.94
C. Comparisons
Scholars have noted similarities between urban renewal and historic zoning. As Lavine
notes, the Berman decision had far reaching effects in that it established an important precedent
that would eventually be used to legitimize historic preservation laws.95 Similarly, Allison and
Peters have noted that “[t]he Berman decision paved the way for historic preservation
regulation.”96 In Berman, the Court used language of aesthetic value to validate urban renewal
programs.97 Fourteen years later, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the
Court again used the language of aesthetics in generally recognizing the validity of historic
preservation laws.98 Furthermore, Clark has noted that the origins of historic zoning laws in New
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See Robin Pogrebin, Preservationists See Through Bulldozers Charging Through a
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at C1; see also Mark Lamster, Modernist Masterwork
Demolished in Fort Worth, GUIDELIVE, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 22, 2013, 1:19 PM),
http://artsblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/modernist-masterwork-demolished-in-fort-worth.html/.
94
See Pogrebin, supra note 93 (“The owner . . . rushes to obtain a demolition or stripping
permit from the city’s Department of Buildings so that notable qualities can be removed,
rendering the structure unworthy of [historic] protection.”); Lamster, supra note 93 (discussing
the demolition of a modernist house before preservationists could succeed in defending it).
95
Lavine, supra note 14.
96
ERIC W. ALLISON & LAUREN PETERS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE LIVABLE CITY
25 (2011); see also Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic
Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 715 (1963) (discussing the connection between Berman v.
Parker and aesthetic regulations).
97
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 26, 33 (1954).
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See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); ALLISON
& PETERS, supra note 96, at 24-25.
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York can be found in earlier renewal legislation and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Berman.99
This Thesis will build on this earlier work by directly comparing case law prior to and following
Berman to determine the effect that the case had on historic zoning regulations.
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See Carol Clark, Albert S. Bard and the Origin of Historic Preservation in New York
State, 18 WIDENER L. REV. 323 (2012).
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III.

METHODOLOGY

The fundamental tool of urban renewal is eminent domain. That power was used by
localities and their agents to condemn properties deemed blighted, demolish them, and then
develop them or transfer them to a private party for development. While eminent domain had
been exercised prior to the advent of urban renewal, the Supreme Court specifically endorsed the
use of eminent domain for urban renewal purposes in the landmark 1954 case, Berman v.
Parker.100 Later, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court
upheld historic landmark designation and found that it did not constitute a taking, because it was
a valid exercise of a locality’s police power.101 In reaching its decision, the Court also recognized
the validity of historic zoning regulations in general.102
The Berman and Penn Central cases seem quite different as one upholds the ability of a
locality to condemn, take, and demolish private property in order to make way for new
development, while the other upholds the ability of a locality to effectively mandate the
preservation a privately owned piece of property. Both cases, however, broadly deal with the
power of local governments to regulate in furtherance of the “general welfare.” An expansive
view of what constitutes the general welfare can therefore be used to legally justify either
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Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1955).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). As discussed
below in Chapter Five, the procedural history of Penn Central is more complicated. The New
York Court of Appeals determined that that case was not about general zoning districts, but
rather about the designation of individual structures as landmarks – a point conceded by the
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the majority of the United States Supreme Court, in upholding the
designation and finding that no taking had occurred, generally found that landmark designation
was similar to historic districting and joined the two concepts. See infra notes 283-91 and
accompanying text.
102
438 U.S. at 129.
101
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government sponsored destruction or preservation, even if against the wishes of individual
property owners.
Does such an expansive definition suggest that historic zoning and urban renewal are
built on essentially the same legal principle? This Thesis seeks to answer that question by
identifying, collecting, and analyzing case law from both before and after Berman v. Parker. By
engaging in this analysis of case law, this Thesis seeks to explore the legal similarities between
the programs in order to contribute to existing and future scholarship that seeks to compare the
programs. Moreover, a comparison between the legal justifications for the programs will
hopefully demonstrate that justifying police power action with an expansive understanding of the
general welfare and the police power can lead to undesirable outcomes, even if such an
expansive understanding is based on the laudable intentions of reviving an urban center or
preserving historic structures. While there is still ongoing debate over the benefits, costs, and
lasting effects of historic zoning, a potential similarity between the underlying legal basis for
historic zoning and urban renewal should show that the exercise of the police power for the
general welfare may be too dangerous to grant to a city council or planning commission. Even if
an expansive reading of the general welfare can be used for the laudable intention of preserving
the built cultural heritage of cities, states, and the nation, that same power could quickly be used
instead to destroy those properties.
The method used to answer the question posed by this Thesis is primarily doctrinal.
Doctrinal research is that “which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a
particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and,
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perhaps, predicts future developments.”103 Moreover, doctrinal research is based on the “blackletter” of the law, and thus synthesizes, compares, and clarifies particular topics bases on an
analysis of both authoritative legal texts, such as statutes and case law, in addition to secondary
sources, such as scholarly commentary.104 Doctrinal research finds a strong corollary in the
qualitative research methodology of the social sciences.105 Legal rules and regimes are not
necessarily made up of quantifiable data, but rather on a set of norms that is both fixed and
constantly evolving.106 Theoretical research seeks to create a “more complete understanding of
the conceptual bases of legal principles.”107 Comparative and historical research describes
contrasting legal regimes and contextualizes them within a selected era using social sciences, in
this case, Urban and Regional Planning.108
To undertake this analysis, it was first necessary to identify cases across the United States
that dealt with the issue of historic zoning. These cases were then compared with Berman v.
Parker and analyzed against that case. If the same justification was used in historic zoning cases
as Berman v. Parker, then inferentially it can be concluded that both historic zoning and urban
renewal are based on the same legal foundation. These authoritative sources are analyzed and
synthesized using both the doctrinal and theoretical methods to offer a more complete
understanding of the development of both historic zoning and urban renewal legal regimes.
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See Terry C. Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, Defining and Describing What We Do:
Doctrinal Legal Research, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 83, 98 (2012); MARTHA MINOW, ARCETYPAL
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP – A FIELD GUIDE, in AALS WORKSHOP FOR NEW LAW TEACHERS (AALS,
2006), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/2006nlt/nltworkbook06.pdf.
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MIKE MCCONVILLE & WING HONG CHUI, RESEARCH METHODS FOR LAW 3-4 (2007).
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Hutchinson & Duncan, supra note 103, at 107.
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Id at 107-08.
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Id.
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See Minow, supra note 103.
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Cases were identified by searching the WestlawNext database. A search was made of all
state and federal cases prior to November 22, 1954, the date of the Berman decision. The query
was to find all cases that contained the word “zon***” and any of the following terms: “historic
district” “historic preservation” “landmark ordinance.” This search was used to find any case that
dealt with any sort of government sponsored historic preservation zoning program. The word
zon***, using universal figures, was searched as is so as to allow for the return of any case that
may mention, for example, “historic district zoning” but not “historic zones,” or “historic zone”
but not “historic zoning.” The general term “historic” was not used in the search query because it
would generate too many irrelevant results owing to the common nature of the term.109
The first search, as described above, generated no results. For purposes of this Thesis,
however, it is necessary to determine the state of historic zoning prior to Berman in order to
determine if Berman and urban renewal were fundamentally legally related to historic zoning.
Therefore, analogous ordinances in existence, and challenged in the courts, before Berman had to
be identified. Zoning ordinances had become common practice prior to Berman, and zoning on
the basis of aesthetics was an issue frequently addressed by the courts as they developed the
concept of the general welfare.
Historic zoning has been considered a form of aesthetic zoning; and, therefore, aesthetic
zoning provides an analogous form of ordinance prior to Berman that can be compared to
historic zoning following Berman.110 Aesthetic zoning is essentially a zoning practice that bases
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The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic
district” “landmark ordinance”) & zon*** & DA (bef 11-22-1954).
110
See, e.g., Estate of Neuberger v. Middletown, 521 A.2d 1336, 1340 (N.J. App. 1987)
(citing MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.31 (3d ed. 1986)) (“Historic preservation
has been classified as an aspect of aesthetics in zoning.”); see also Julie Van Camp, Aesthetics
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regulations solely on the outward aesthetic appearance of a structure. Because historic zoning has
been considered a form of aesthetic zoning, the term “aesthetic” was added to the query for cases
prior to November 22, 1954.111 This search one hundred and sixty-seven results from the high
courts of thirty-eight states.
Next, essentially the same search was conducted for cases after November 22, 1954 but
before June 26, 1978, the date of the Penn Central decision. The requirement that results include
the search term “historic” was also added to the query, to ensure that results were limited to those
that actually dealt with historic ordinances.112 This refinement allowed for a more precise
analysis of the effects of Berman on historic zoning jurisprudence. If the additional term were
not added, the search would have returned many results that did not deal with historic zoning, for
example those that dealt only with aesthetic zoning issues related to the First Amendment. This
search was undertaken with the latter date restriction in order to identify cases that upheld the
validity of historic zoning ordinances prior to the Penn Central case. It was necessary to identify
these cases separately in order to determine whether the doctrines justifying urban renewal in
Berman had been used to justify historic zoning, even before the Supreme Court generally

and the law of Historic Preservation, presented to the American Society for Aesthetics (October
23, 1980), available at http://csulb.edu/`jvancamp/ASA_1980.pdf (“The use of legal means to
promote and regulate historic preservation is often justified by appeal to aesthetic values . . . .”).
111
The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic
district” “landmark ordinance” “aesthetic”) & zon*** & DA (bef 11-22-1954).
112
The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic
district” “landmark ordinance” “aesthetic”) & zon*** & historic & DA (aft 11-22-1954 & bef 626-1978).
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addressed historic zoning in Penn Central.113 This search generated forty-nine total results from
the high courts of twenty-three states.
Following these searches, the results of cases before and after the Berman decision were
compared. First, the results were compared to identify state high court decisions that were
represented in both groups of cases. This was done for the purpose of identifying states that may
or may not have changed their jurisprudence specifically because of the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Berman. It was important to identify states that may have issued decisions
regarding aesthetic and historic zoning both before and after Berman in order to determine
whether Berman, and thus the legal justification for urban renewal, impacted the legal
justification for historic zoning. This comparison revealed that the high courts of nineteen states
rendered decisions on the issues identified both prior to and following the Berman decision.114
This comparison reduced the case lists to ninety-seven cases prior to Berman and forty-five cases
following Berman.115 Next, a doctrinal analysis of these cases was undertaken to develop an
overview of the conception of the general welfare and the police power as related to aesthetic
and historic zoning in these nineteen states before and after the Berman decision.
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As discussed below, historic zoning, per se, was not a direct issue in Penn Central. At
issue was a landmark ordinance that provided for the designation of discrete structures as
landmarks. Nonetheless, in upholding the landmark ordinance as a valid exercise of the
regulatory power, and one that does not necessitate compensation, the Supreme Court generally
recognized the constitutionality of historic zoning pursuant to a comprehensive plan. See Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129-33 (1978); see also infra notes 283-91 and
accompanying text.
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The states were Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
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Full lists of these cases are included below in Appendices A and B.
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A summary of these cases is contained below in Chapters Four and Five, and an analysis
follows in Chapter Six. The summaries and analyses are undertaken with the ultimate goal of
determining if Berman, which laid out the legal justification for urban renewal, marked a
definitive change in the concept of the general welfare and the police power, thereby allowing
historic zoning to proceed.116
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A discussion on the scope or propriety of using judicial review to determine what
does or does not constitute the general welfare and outer bounds of the police power is beyond
scope of this Thesis. Rather, this Thesis seeks simply to analyze how the understanding of the
police power and the concept of the general welfare, as developed in case law, underlies a
fundamental legal similarity between urban renewal and historic preservation.
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IV.

JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO BERMAN

The initial search for cases decided prior to Berman that involved the validity of historic
zoning returned no results. The lack of results cannot be read to suggest that no historic
ordinances existed prior to the Berman decision; however, it can be read to suggest that any such
ordinances were not widely challenged. Moreover, it is possible that the search was under
inclusive as such ordinances could have been identified by other titles early in the Twentieth
Century. Nonetheless, to compare the judicial interpretation of historic zoning before and after
Berman’s urban renewal decision, cases prior to Berman that dealt with issues analogous to
historic zoning needed to be identified. To this end, the search term “aesthetic” was added to the
search query. “Aesthetic” was chosen because zoning for aesthetic considerations has been
analogized to zoning for historic preservation. A search for cases including the term “aesthetic”
prior to Berman returned ninety-seven cases from the high courts of the nineteen states that also
rendered opinions on these zoning issues following Berman. Therefore, summaries of the
concept of aesthetic zoning and the general welfare in these nineteen states, prior to the Berman
decision, are contained below.
Overall, an analysis of these cases revealed that the high courts of most of the nineteen
states identified refused to recognize aesthetics, alone, as a legitimate exercise of the police
power for the general welfare. In other words, the courts would not uphold any ordinance or law
that appeared to restrict the use of private property on solely aesthetic grounds. In so doing, the
courts repeatedly stated that the only legitimate use of the police power was to regulate property
so as to protect public health, safety, morality, or welfare. Importantly, the concept of “welfare”
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was, comparatively, narrowly defined so as not to include aesthetics alone.117 Many of these
courts, however, did recognize that the aesthetics and beauty of the community was a matter of
public interest and could be tangentially related to the exercise of the police power.118 In other
words, these courts refused to declare invalid an ordinance that regulated property in the interest
of public health or safety, but also had the effect of creating, in the eyes of the city government
or justices, a more aesthetically pleasing environment. A more detailed discussion of the relevant
aspects of these cases and the implications for the states identified follows below. A brief
summary of Berman v. Parker is also included below as it is used as the before and after point of
reference for jurisprudence discussed in this Thesis.
A. State Summaries
Arkansas
In Herring v. Stannus, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the city council
did not abuse its discretion by issuing a special permit for a filling station in a zone that
prohibited such establishments.119 While the court did not explicitly reach the issue of aesthetics
in its holding, however, it did "conced[e] - without deciding – [that the] police power may not be
used for purely aesthetic purposes.”120
California
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See, e.g., Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Mass.1949)
(noting that an ordinance may not be upheld on aesthetic grounds alone).
118
See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo.1948) (noting that
where an ordinance may be upheld on other police power grounds, aesthetic considerations are
entitled to some weight).
119
Herring v. Stannus, 275 S.W. 321, 325 (Ark. 1924).
120
Id. at 324.
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Two California zoning cases prior to Berman specifically state that zoning ordinances
that bear no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morality, or welfare will be
struck down as invalid. The Supreme Court of California stated as much in Feraut v. City of
Sacramento, a case in which a general zoning scheme was upheld despite some spot zoning of
businesses.121 While the court did not reach the issue of “aesthetics alone” zoning, it nonetheless
maintained that zoning ordinances must be based on the foundation of protecting public health,
safety, morality, or welfare.122 Again in Beverly Oil v. City of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court of
California held that zoning must be related to public health, safety, or welfare.123 In that case, the
court upheld a prohibition on certain expansions of an oil drilling operation by noting that oil
drilling was specifically declared by law to be detrimental to public health, safety, and
welfare.124 In short, the court did not uphold the ordinance on the basis of aesthetic sense, but
rather on a tangible threat to the general welfare, as described in the code.
Connecticut
Several Connecticut cases tangentially discussed the issue of aesthetics in dicta. In Town
of Windsor v. Whitney, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a zoning ordinance that
established building lines and setback requirements.125 The court, however, did not uphold the
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Feraut v. City of Sacramento, 269 P. 537, 541 (Cal. 1928).
Id. (“It is only when it is palpable that the measure in controversy has no real or
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare that it will be nullified
by the courts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P.
385 (Cal. 1925)).
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Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865, 869 (Cal. 1953) (en banc).
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ordinance on aesthetic grounds.126 Rather, the court analogized the restrictions to those that
provide for adequate ventilation and air space, holding that such regulations fall within the scope
of traditional police power activity, that is, regulation for the benefit of the public health, safety,
or welfare.127 The court specifically noted that the building lines tended to “preserve the public
health, add to the public safety from fire, and enhance the public welfare by bettering living
conditions and increasing general prosperity of the neighborhood.”128 Rather than deciding the
issue on aesthetic grounds, the court held that the ordinances served traditional police power
functions related to protecting public health and safety.
In Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor and Murphy v. Town of Westport, the court reached
largely similar conclusions. In Gionfriddo, the court declared an ordinance prohibiting the
display of vehicles for sale to be unconstitutional, stating that aesthetics alone is not enough to
justify the prohibition and that such a prohibition did not relate to property value, public health,
safety, or welfare.129 In Murphy, the court remanded the case for lack of facts, but in so doing,
noted that, even with a shifting conception of aesthetics and the police power, aesthetics alone
could not be used to justify the use of the police power.130
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Id. The court did, however, discuss the changing conception of aesthetic
considerations. See id. at 357.
127
Id. at 357 (“They regulate the air space, light, and ventilation of rooms. . . .
Regulations of this character, if reasonable, do not constitute a taking of property.”).
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Id.
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Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 81 A.2d 266, 268 (Conn. 1951).
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Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 179-81, 183 (Conn. 1944).
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Kansas
In Ware v. City of Wichita, the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a zoning ordinance that
provided for the separation of land uses.131 In upholding the ordinance, the court discussed
aesthetic regulations, but did not base its holding on aesthetic considerations alone.132While the
court noted that the police power was broad, it ultimately upheld the ordinance on the basis that
it provided for the public health, safety, and welfare.133
Louisiana
Prior to Berman, the Supreme Court of Louisiana largely seemed to pass on the issue of
aesthetic alone zoning regulations. In New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, the court held
that an ordinance requiring a certain type of fence around junkyards was invalid.134 While the
court passed on the aesthetics argument raised at trial, it ultimately struck the ordinance because
the particular fence mandated was not necessary for public safety.135 The court determined that
as long as a property use did “not offend public morals or jeopardize the health and safety of the
public,” it was a legitimate use.136
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Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99, 102 (Kan. 1923).
Id. (discussing the argument that aesthetic considerations “be recognized as sufficient
in themselves”).
133
Id. at 101-02 (“It cannot be denied, however, that there is good ground for the view
that a reasonable zoning ordinance has some pertinent relation to the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community.”).
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City of New Orleans v. S. Auto Wreckers, 192 So. 523, 527 (La. 1939).
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Id. (“This discussion and the decisions cited which touch [aesthetic reasons] have no
application here, for the reason that this ordinance is a safety measure.”).
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Id.
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Similarly, in State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans, the court upheld an ordinance
which prohibited business uses in residential districts.137 The court found that, in passing the
ordinances, the locality reasonably had public health and safety considerations in mind.138 The
court did not explicitly state that aesthetic considerations alone either could or could not serve as
a justification for the police power. It did, however, note that, while prior precedent suggested
aesthetic considerations alone were not sufficient, the general welfare likely encompassed
aesthetics.139
Thereafter, in New Orleans v. Levy, the court considered the validity of a historic district
ordinance.140 The court upheld the ordinance on constitutional grounds, because the Louisiana
Constitution had recently been amended to allow for the creation of historic districts.141 The
court held that the ordinance was valid pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution, asserting that it
properly preserved both the sentimental and commercial values of New Orleans.142 The court
thus seemed to recognize the ordinance’s validity, in part, because it promoted tourism, and
therefore, the commercial value of the city. 143 Nonetheless, the court did note in passing that
“[p]erhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant an imposition of the several
restrictions contained in the Vieux Carre Commission Ordinance.”144
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Maryland
In Maryland Advertising Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court held that the city improperly denied the Plaintiff a permit to construct a billboard on a
vacant lot on which billboards were not prohibited.145 The court did not reach the issue of
aesthetic regulations for procedural reasons.146 However, the court did state that the city’s action
was invalid because it was arbitrary and bore no relation to public health, safety, morals, or
welfare.147
In Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., the Maryland Court of Appeals held that an ordinance
prohibiting the erection of new dwellings unless they were constructed as separate buildings was
unconstitutional.148 The court stated that “[t]he act does not relate to the police power, and its
enforcement would deprive the appellee of property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which
cannot be invaded for purely aesthetic purposes under the guise of the police power.”149 The
court reached the same conclusion in Goldman v. Crowther, holding that ordinances which bore
no relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare, were void.150 The court noted that because
the ordinances “rest[ed] solely upon aesthetic grounds,” they were invalid.151
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Massachusetts
Prior to the Berman decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts routinely held
that aesthetic considerations alone were not enough to warrant the exercise of the police power.
In 122 Main Street v. City of Brockton, the Massachusetts court held that an ordinance
establishing minimum building heights was invalid because it was unrelated to public health and
safety.152 Particularly, the court found that the ordinance was seemingly based on aesthetic
considerations — that structures less than two stories would harm the aesthetic nature of the
street.153 However, the court explicitly rejected this rationale as a basis for the use of the police
power.154
Again in Barney and Casey v. Milton, the court held that an ordinance zoning the plaintiff
landowner’s property as residential was invalid as applied to that particular property.155 This case
is of particular importance because the high court reversed the decision of the trial judge,
specifically because the trial judge upheld the ordinance based on aesthetic considerations
alone.156 The Massachusetts court held that aesthetics alone was not a valid justification for using
the police power to abridge property rights.157
Michigan
In a series of cases from 1943 through 1951, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
ordinances establishing minimum lot sizes or building sizes were invalid exercises of local
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power.158 Specifically, the court noted that these ordinances were based more on aesthetic
considerations than concerns for the public’s health, safety, or welfare.159 The court noted that
neither aesthetic considerations alone nor the desire to protect property values alone was a valid
use of the police power.160 Rather, the government action had to bear some relation to public
health, safety, or welfare.161
Missouri
In City of St. Louis v. Friedman, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the validity of an
ordinance that prohibited the operation of junk yards in an industrial zone.162 The court did,
however, note that the decision was not based on aesthetic considerations alone, because
aesthetics alone could not justify the use of the police power.163 The court, in other words, found
the ordinance to be valid because it touched on traditionally recognized police power action.
While the court did not explicitly state what justification was used, the language suggests that the
court found the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power to protect public safety.164
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See id.
35

New Hampshire
In Sundeen v. Rogers, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld that validity of a
zoning ordinance that established certain set back requirements for auxiliary buildings in
residential districts.165 The landowner challenging the ordinance argued that it was grounded
solely in aesthetic considerations.166 The court, however, rejected this argument and, citing
general zoning jurisprudence, found that the setback requirements were in the interest of public
health and safety.167 The court noted that, while aesthetics alone may not be enough to justify the
use of the police power, aesthetics could be considered in conjunction with the protection of the
public, health, safety, morals, or welfare.168 In short, the court upheld the ordinance on the basis
of public health and safety, not on aesthetics alone.
New York
In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, the Court of Appeals of New York held that an
ordinance prohibiting businesses in a residential zone was invalid.169 The zone in question was
located near the entrance to the village, and the ordinance was apparently adopted to ensure that
the village frontage would remain aesthetically pleasing.170 The court was unable to find a
justification for the ordinance in the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare.171 Noting
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that the ordinance was justified with purely aesthetic reasons, the court found that ordinance was
an invalid use of the police power.172
North Carolina
In Appeal of Parker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the validity of an
ordinance that prohibited the erection of a wall along the street line.173 The court did not uphold
the ordinance on aesthetic grounds.174 Rather, the court upheld the ordinance on the basis that it
protected public safety.175 The court noted that safe streets required open and unobstructed views
over crossing and intersections.176 Therefore, the police power could be used to protect public
safety by prohibiting the erection of walls along the street line that would create visual
obstructions. In short, the court upheld the ordinance on public safety grounds; however, it did
note that it would not be inappropriate to give some weight to aesthetic considerations as the
ordinance could be upheld on other grounds.177
Pennsylvania
Prior to the decision in Berman, Pennsylvania courts strongly found that property owners
could not be deprived of the right to use their property freely for purely aesthetic reasons. In
Appeal of Medinger, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared an ordinance establishing
minimum lot sizes to be unconstitutional.178 The court stated in strong language that "neither
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aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of economic values
in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the morals or the safety
or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property owners."179
Similarly, in Appeal of Lord, the court found that a zoning board acted improperly when
it denied a permit for a landowner to erect a radio tower in a residential district.180 The court
stated that a city cannot use zoning to deprive an owner of the right to use his property because
the zoning board believes that what he plans to erect is not artistic or aesthetically pleasing.181
Further, in Petition of Standard Investment Corp., the court found that it was invalid to deny a
permit to construct a filling station in a business district for purely aesthetic reasons.182 The court
determined that the ordinance did not relate to the proper scope of the police power to protect
public health, safety, or welfare.183 Specifically, the court held that to be valid, ordinances “must
not be from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic laws or for purely
aesthetic considerations.”184
Rhode Island
In City of Providence v. Stephens, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that
apartment homes could be excluded from a residential district on the grounds that the exclusion
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would promote public health and safety by lessening the risk of fire and congestion.185 The court
did, however specifically state that it was not upholding the ordinance on aesthetic grounds,
noting that “private advantage or purely aesthetic considerations do not supply sufficient basis
for the exercise of the police power.”186 Similarly, in Sundlum v. Zoning Board of Review, the
court held that a zoning board acted improperly in denying a permit to erect a filling station in a
residential district, because the record did not indicate that the station presented a threat to public
health or safety.187 In that case, the court overturned the decision of the zoning board, because
the board denied the permit solely on aesthetic grounds.188 The court reiterated that aesthetic
considerations alone cannot justify the use of the police power.189
Vermont
In the case of Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, the Supreme Court of
Vermont was confronted with a challenge to a law that declared junkyards to be nuisances.190
While the court discussed general developments in the field of zoning and nuisance law, it would
not recognize aesthetic considerations alone to be proper bases for the exercise of the police
power.191 Specifically, the court found that a junk yard could not be declared a nuisance by the
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legislature for purely aesthetic reasons.192 Similarly, the court noted that zoning ordinances could
not be used to prohibit the operation of junk yards for solely aesthetic reasons.193
Virginia
The Supreme Court of Virginia decisions displayed a strongly deferential stance towards
determinations of lawmakers; however, the court still struck down ordinances that could not be
justified by traditional understandings of the police power. In West Brothers Brick Company v.
City of Alexandria, the court upheld the validity of an ordinance that prohibited further
expansion of a brick plant in a residential district.194 The court showed strong deference to the
determinations of the legislature, city council, and planner in finding that the ordinance was
related to public health, safety, and welfare.195 Nonetheless, the court did state that aesthetic
considerations alone could not justify police power activity.196
In City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., the court addressed the validity of an ordinance
prohibiting the erection of floodlights on a filling station.197 The court did not explicitly address
aesthetic considerations; however, the court held that ordinance was invalid. The court found that
the ordinance did not affect public health, safety, morals, or welfare, and therefore was not a
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proper exercise of the police power.198 In short, the court recognized that ordinances unrelated to
the traditional scope of the police power were invalid.
Maine, New Mexico, and Washington
As identified by the search, no cases decided prior to Berman by the high courts of
Maine, New Mexico, or Washington were relevant to the question posed by this Thesis. 199
B. Berman v. Parker
In Berman v. Parker, appellants sought to enjoin the condemnation of their property
which was located within a Washington D.C. redevelopment zone.200 In seeking an injunction,
appellants challenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945, Washington D.C.’s urban renewal legislation.201 The Redevelopment Act provided for the
condemnation and transfer of private property for the “the redevelopment of blighted territory in
the District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or
causes of blight.”202 Further, the Act declared that “the acquisition and the assembly of real
property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area
redevelopment plan . . . is hereby declared to be a public use.”203 Following the acquisition and
assembly of land, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency was permitted to sell or
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lease the land to private developers who would develop the land in accordance with a general
plan adopted by the National Capital Planning Commission.204
Appellants’ property, used as a department store, was located within a zone deemed
blighted and marked for redevelopment under the Act.205 Appellants’ property was condemned
pursuant to the Act, but appellants challenged the action, arguing that their property was not
blighted and therefore could not be taken.206 Moreover, the appellants further argued, as
summarized by the Court, that “[t]o take for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one thing;
it is quite another, . . . to take a man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, more
attractive community.”207
The lower court was sympathetic to this argument, stating that “[o]ne man's land cannot
be seized by the Government and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may
build upon it a better house or a house which better meets the Government's idea of what is
appropriate or well-designed.”208 Nonetheless, the lower court upheld the constitutionality of the
Redevelopment Act by finding that the Land Agency could only condemn property for slum
clearance, because slums were “injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare.”209 The
lower court, therefore, essentially upheld the constitutionality of the Act on more traditional
public health, safety, and welfare grounds.
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117 F. Supp. at 725.

The lower court remained wary of the proposition that eminent domain could be used for
purposes beyond the protection of public health, safety, morals or welfare.210 In modifying the
lower court’s decision, however, the Supreme Court of the United went further.211 The Supreme
Court ultimately determined that even non-blighted property within a development zone could be
taken, because such a taking was necessary to achieve the Redevelopment Act’s larger purpose
of slum and blight clearance.212 The Court opined that if an individual owner “were permitted to
resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”213
In upholding the constitutionality of the Redevelopment Act, the Supreme Court
professed deference to the legislature and stated that “when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”214 Although noting that it is “fruitless”
to define the scope of the police power, the Court essentially held that a legislature is capable of
defining the extent of the police power.215 Seemingly because Congress had declared the
acquisition and assembly of private property to be a public use, condemnation and subsequent
transfer to redevelopment companies was a valid exercise of eminent domain in service to the
police power, and was not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As the Court stated, if “the
object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.”216
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In determining that the Redevelopment Act was indeed instituted for the public interest,
the Court discussed the scope of the police power and the concept of the public welfare. It noted
that the preservation of public safety, health, morality, peace, quiet, law and order were more
conspicuous examples of the police power.217 However, the Court stated that these applications
did not delimit the police power.218 Asserting that disreputable housing conditions were an ugly
sore that robbed a community of its charm, the court found that
[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
Values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. . . . If [Congress] decide[s] that the Nation’s
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.219
Where the District Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Act on traditional police
power grounds, the Supreme Court went further and declared that the police power, and therefore
eminent domain, could essentially be used to beautify a community.220 In its discussion, this
Thesis seeks to explore whether this holding in Berman served as the basis for upholding historic
zoning ordinances. If so, historic zoning, though seemingly opposed to urban renewal, would
share fundamental legal ties to urban renewal legislation.
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V.

JURISPRUDENCE FOLLOWING BERMAN

Forty-five state high court decisions were identified by conducting the search for cases
following Berman but prior to Penn Central.221 These cases span across nineteen states that also
were identified in the search of cases prior to Berman. Therefore, summaries of the concept of
historic zoning, aesthetic zoning, and the general welfare in these nineteen states, following the
Berman decision, are contained below. While reaching mixed conclusions, many of these cases
show that state high courts were more likely to uphold historic zoning by using the broad concept
of the general welfare and police power derived from the Berman decision. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that regulation could not be used to create aesthetically pleasing results, but
could be used to preserve aesthetically pleasing or historic sites;222 the Supreme Court of
Connecticut passed on ruling directly on historic zoning, though noted that it likely was a valid
aspect of the general welfare;223 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that aesthetics alone
could not serve as the sole basis for zoning, but nonetheless embraced a broad definition of
general welfare as proposed in Berman;224 and, the high courts of New Hampshire, New Mexico,
and Massachusetts embraced Berman’s broad scope of the general welfare and upheld historic
zoning ordinances.225
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A brief summary of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York is also
included below as the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case is generally
considered of great importance to historic preservation.226
A. State Summaries
Connecticut
In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed
the decision of the local historic commission to deny a certificate of appropriateness for
demolishing a structure within a historic zone.227 The court ultimately held that the historic
commission properly denied the certificate and upheld the validity of the ordinance at issue.228 In
so doing, the court cited the Berman decision and the Massachusetts Supreme Court and found
that public welfare includes the preservation of historic areas.229 Although the court chose to pass
on whether aesthetics alone is enough to justify the use of the police power, it noted that the
concept of public welfare is very “broad and inclusive.”230 Further, it did not explicitly state that
historic zoning served to protect public health or safety. While passing on the issue of aesthetics

226
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Id. at 170-71 (quoting 348 U.S. at 33). In quoting Berman’s language regarding
aesthetics, the court seemed to recognize that historic zoning necessarily involved aesthetic
considerations. Id. at 170. While the court noted that aesthetics alone may not be enough, it did
not invalidate the regulations at issue, because they were neither vague nor undefined. Id.
Moreover, the court “indicated that aesthetic considerations may have a definite relation to the
public welfare.” Id. at 171 (citations omitted).
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alone, it nonetheless seemed to base its decision almost entirely on an expansive understanding
of “public welfare” that includes historic and aesthetic considerations.231
Maryland
The search returned no cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that directly
addressed historic zoning. However, some cases addressing billboard regulations were identified.
In these cases, the Maryland court struck down local ordinances that prohibited the erection of
billboards or painted signs.232 While a full analysis of the aesthetic implications of the ordinances
was not necessary for the court to reach its holdings, it nonetheless stated that aesthetics alone
could not justify the use of the police power to restrict the erection of billboards or painted
signs.233 However, in Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Schwartz, Inc., the court recognized that
aesthetic considerations did play a proper role when used for preservation. The court stated that
“the police power may rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is generally regarded by
the public to be pleasing to the eye or historically or architecturally significant.”234
Massachusetts
Following Berman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued opinions that
directly covered aesthetic and historic zoning regulations. In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v.
Outdoor Advertising Board, the court upheld the locality’s decision to deny plaintiff’s permit for
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off-premises outdoor advertising signs.235 The court noted that it is not possible to fix firm limits
to the police power, and explicitly concluded “that aesthetics alone may justify the exercise of
the police power; that within the broad concept of ‘general welfare,’ cities and towns may enact
reasonable bill-board regulations designed to preserve and improve their physical
environment.”236 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited language in Berman for the
proposition “that the general welfare embraces aesthetic considerations.”237 Moreover the court
noted that “[a]lthough Berman involved the use of eminent domain, this expansive view of the
general welfare is applicable to the zoning power.”238 The Massachusetts court thus adopted
Berman’s entanglement of the police power and eminent domain, effectively recognizing that if a
government has authority to act under one power it also has authority to act under the other.
Furthermore the court noted that the increased weight given to aesthetic considerations was
related to historic zoning.239
The Massachusetts court also directly addressed the constitutionality of historic zoning in
two separate opinions which answered questions posed by the Massachusetts Senate.240 In both
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instances, the court suggested that historic district zoning was constitutional.241 The court
extensively discussed aesthetic zoning and its relationship to historic zoning.242 The court
specifically discussed earlier decisions that held that aesthetic considerations alone could not
justify the exercise of the police power, because the police power and zoning must relate directly
to public health and safety and less directly to public morals.243 The court even noted that the
proposed historic zoning act could “hardly be said in any ordinary sense to relate to the public
safety, health, or morals.”244
However, the court went on to discuss how earlier decisions restricting zoning to
situations that addressed public health, safety, or morals were decided prior to the “general
acceptance” of extensive zoning restrictions.245 Directly citing Berman, the Massachusetts court
stated that “[t]here is reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic
considerations than was given to them [in the early twentieth century].”246 The court then went
on to note how the construction of “incongruous structures” could destroy the historic character
of the town.247 Ultimately, based on an expanding conception of the police power and the public
welfare, as embraced in Berman, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded that the historic
district zoning act would be constitutional.248
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New Hampshire
Following Berman, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explicitly held that historic
zoning was within the scope of the police power.249 In reaching this conclusion, the court
analogized historic zoning to aesthetic regulations.250 The court cited the Massachusetts Supreme
Court’s Opinion of the Justices to the Senate for the proposition that aesthetic and historic zoning
was within the scope of the police power.251 It is important to note that the New Hampshire court
cited the Opinion of the Justices, because that opinion in turn directly cited to Berman for
justification to find historic zoning valid.252
New Mexico
In Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the
conviction of a landowner for violating an ordinance that required only certain windows be used
for structures in a historic district.253 In upholding the conviction, the court generally upheld the
validity of the ordinance.254 The court declined to discuss whether aesthetics alone could be the
basis for zoning, but did mention that, under the precedent set in Berman, this was an
accelerating trend.255 Nonetheless, in upholding the ordinance, the court did discuss the
importance of aesthetics to historic neighborhoods and the importance of historic neighborhoods
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to tourism.256 The court determined, therefore, that historic zoning was a valid exercise of the
police power, in part at least because it helped provide for tourism revenue.257 Further, New
Mexico Supreme Court discussed the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Opinion of the Justices in
reaching the conclusion that historic zoning was a valid exercise of the police power.258
New York
In Lutheran Church v. New York, the Court of Appeals of New York adjudicated a case
in which the plaintiff landowner challenged the designation of its property as a historic
landmark.259 The court’s ultimate holding was that the designation could not be upheld as a nonconfiscatory use of the police power, because the owner was essentially denied all economically
viable use of his property under the requirement that the property not be demolished.260 In
reaching this holding, it was unnecessary for the court to address the issue of aesthetic or historic
zoning.
The dissent, however, sought to uphold the landmark designation and noted that
landmark laws, while leaning heavily on economic justifications – for example, that they
promote tourism or protect property values – serve the primary purpose of protecting aesthetic
and historic properties.261 In this discussion, the dissent suggested that perhaps it was time that
aesthetics was seen as a valid justification of the police power in and of itself, because “historic
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preservation promotes aesthetic values by adding to the variety, the beauty and the quality of
life.”262
Pennsylvania
In Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
validity of an ordinance establishing a single family residential zone as applied to a structure
with twenty two bedrooms and seven baths.263 In upholding the ordinance, the court extensively
quoted from Berman for the proposition that the concept of the general welfare is broad and that
it encompasses aesthetics.264 The court also quoted from the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate for the proposition that historic zoning as well fell within
the scope of the general welfare and the police power.265 The court further stated that if the
legislature can compel the sale of a property to create a more attractive community, it can
certainly regulate property to create a more attractive community.266 Ultimately, the court
determined that
not only is the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a
community a proper element of the general welfare, but also the
preservation of property values is a legitimate consideration since
“[A]nything that tends to destroy property values of the inhabitants
of the [community] necessarily adversely affects the prosperity,
and therefore the general welfare, of the entire [community].”267
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In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declared invalid an ordinance that established minimum lot sizes.268 The locality defending the
ordinance argued that it was necessary to preserve the historic and aesthetically pleasing, rural
environment in the locality.269 The court found, however, that the ordinance was not in the
interests of the general welfare because it essentially served to protect the interests of landowners
already residing on larger lots within the locality.270 The police power, therefore, could not be
used because the ordinance did not relate to public health, safety, or welfare.271 In reaching this
holding, the court explicitly noted in a footnote that “zoning may not be sustained solely on the
basis of aesthetic considerations.”272
In Shapp v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania found that a state constitutional provision making the state a protector in trust of
aesthetic and historic sites in the state was not self-executing, but required further legislation in
order to prohibit development near historic sites.273 While the case does not involve a challenge
to the validity of an ordinance, it is nonetheless important to report because the court specifically
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stated that through the new constitutional provision, “the Commonwealth has been given power
to act in areas of purely aesthetic or historic concern.”274
Virginia
In Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed an ordinance
that established architectural design review regulations.275 The case is relevant to this Thesis to
the extent that the court ultimately found that a locality could not use the police power for solely
aesthetic purposes.276 The court’s decision, however, was based largely on the fact that the
ordinances were outside of the scope of the pertinent enabling legislation.277 The court
specifically noted that the Code of Virginia permitted the creation of historic districts and design
guidelines under certain circumstances.278 The ordinance at issue was invalid because it failed to
conform to the guidelines of that legislation.279
Washington
In Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Construction Co., Inc., the Supreme Court of
Washington found that the police power could be used to protect aesthetics when it also served to
protect against economic loss.280 The court, therefore, passed on deciding whether the police
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power could be invoked for aesthetic considerations alone.281 This case was of little relevance to
this Thesis as it involved environmental legislation rather than historic zoning.
Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont
As identified by the search, no cases decided after Berman by the high courts of
Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, or Vermont were relevant to the question posed by this Thesis.282
B. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
Finally, in addition to state courts that addressed the issue of historic zoning, the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the issue on June 26, 1978, in the case of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.283 While Penn Central is famous for its applications to
inverse condemnation and takings analyses, it also served to generally recognize the validity of
historic district zoning ordinances and landmark ordinances.284 Before reaching its holding on
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See id. at 201.
Although there may have been no cases from these states that were relevant to the
question posed by this Thesis, these cases are still included below in Appendix B with a brief
description suggesting their irrelevance to this Thesis.
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Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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It is useful to note that the lower court had determined that this case was not about
general historic district zoning, but rather about the designation of individual structures as
landmarks. See id. at 138 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority, however, in upholding
the designation and finding that no taking had occurred, generally found that landmark
designation was similar to historic districting and essentially linked the two concepts. The
majority, for example, noted that the landmark designation had been applied to all the structures
in New York’s thirty one historic districts in addition to four hundred other individual
landmarks. See 438 U.S. 104, 134. The majority equated the burdens on these properties to those
felt by properties under zoning regulations. Id. at 133-34. While the appellants did not challenge
the landmark ordinance on the grounds that it was an improper use of zoning, the majority
discussed the landmark ordinance within the context of general zoning regulations stating that
while the Landmark Ordinance “has a more severe impact on some landowners than on others . .
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the takings issue, the Court cited Berman and noted that “States and cities may enact land-use
restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable
aesthetic features of a city.”285 The Court also recognized that the landmark ordinance was a
valid exercise of the police power, similar to historic zoning, because it “embodie[d] a
comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be
found in the city.”286
The Court also generally recognized the validity of historic zoning, noting that
appellants’ arguments would not stand if New York had encumbered the property with historic
district legislation.287 In making this recognition, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Maher v.
City of New Orleans, a Fifth Circuit case that generally found that Berman could be used to
justify historic zoning as within the scope of the police power.288
Finally, the majority in Penn Central did not find that the landmark ordinance’s
requirement to keep property in good repair went beyond the permissible scope of regulatory
activity.289 However, such a requirement, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent burdened

. [s]imilarly, zoning laws often affect some property owners more severely than others but have
not been held to be invalid on that account.” Id.
285
438 U.S. at 129 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (other citations
omitted).
286
Id. at 132.
287
Id. at 131 (citing Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)) (“Appellants,
moreover, also do not dispute that a showing of diminution in property value would not establish
a taking if the restriction had been imposed as a result of historic-district legislation.”).
288
Id.; see 516 F.2d at 1060, 1063-64, 1067 (“Proper state purposes may encompass not
only the goal of abating undesirable conditions, but of fostering ends the community deems
worthy.”) (“Although it primarily concerned a taking, Berman v. Parker supplies an apt analogy
to the present situation.”) (“The Vieux Carre Ordinance was enacted to pursue the legitimate
state goal of preserving the “tout ensemble” of the historic French Quarter.”).
289
See 438 U.S. at 137-38.
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appellants with “an affirmative duty, backed by criminal fines and penalties.”290 Extending the
majority’s rationale Justice Rehnquist opined that where the government desires to preserve
private land for public use, “it need not condemn the property but need merely order that it be
preserved in its present form and be kept ‘in good repair.’”291
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Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 146 n. 9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

VI.

DISCUSSION

Two of the most important tools in a local government’s toolkit are the police power and
eminent domain. These tools are theoretically distinct from each other; however, court decisions
since the beginning of the twentieth century have lessened the barrier between the two powers. In
1954, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in Berman v. Parker that conflated
the outer bounds of the police power as those of eminent domain.292 In that case, the Court
essentially determined that a locality may exercise the power of eminent domain for any purpose
that it could regulate with the police power.293 Effectively, the Court expanded and reinterpreted
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that eminent domain only be exercised for “public use.”294
Rather, in upholding Urban Renewal activity that involved eminent domain, the Court began to
expand the concept of public use so as to be coterminous with the police power.295 Within the
context of eminent domain however, this expansion presents a problem because, as many courts
have noted, the police power should not necessarily have set limitations.296
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 57, 64 & N.38, 66 (Robin Paul Malloy, ed.
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See, e.g., 348 U.S. at 32 (“An attempt to define [the Police Power’s] reach or trace its
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Traditionally, the police power was seen as the power of a government body to pass laws
that provide for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Courts were hesitant to declare
hard limits to the police power, recognizing that changing times and conditions may require a
more or less expansive understanding of the power. Nonetheless, for the first half of the
Twentieth Century, the police power was understood to have the effective limitation that it must
only be exercised for the public health, safety, morals, or welfare; courts were hesitant to expand
that limitation, abridging private property rights in the process. While discussing the police
power in the Berman decision, however, the United States Supreme Court stated that
the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
Values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.297
The question that this discussion seeks to answer is: Did the Supreme Court’s decision in
Berman lead to the validation of historic zoning ordinances where before they may not have been
valid? In short, are the legal justifications for urban renewal espoused by the Supreme Court in
Berman fundamentally related to the legal justifications for historic zoning?

automatically to protect the public against the improper use of private property to the injury of
the public interest.”); Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 812
(Mass.1935) (“These rules and regulations were promulgated in the exercise of the police power.
This court has never undertaken to define that power.”); cf. Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128
N.E.2d 557, 561 (Mass. 1955) (“The term public welfare has never been and cannot be precisely
defined.”). But cf. Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 54 (Md. 1925) (“While it is difficult, if not
impossible, to define precisely the limits of the police power, there must in the very nature of
things be some limit to it, for otherwise the guaranties of written Constitutions would be little
more than mere precatory and directory suggestions without force or life, affording to the citizen
only a false and illusory protection against the invasion of his rights by the state, and his security
would depend, not upon constitutional guaranties, but upon the will of the state in exercising an
unlimited police power.”).
297
Id. at 33.
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C. Overview prior to Berman
The initial search for cases relating to historic zoning ordinances prior to Berman did not
return any results. The lack of results could be due to several factors, or any combination of
them. For example, it is possible that historic zoning ordinances were not in widespread use in
the years prior to the Berman decision. Alternatively, ordinances could have been in use, but may
not have been widely challenged. Regardless, the lack of results required that analogous cases
prior to Berman be identified so as to compare the effects that Berman had on the concept of the
general welfare and historic zoning in particular. For this reason, cases dealing with aesthetic
zoning prior to Berman were identified and analyzed. Aesthetic zoning cases were chosen
because historic zoning has generally been recognized as a form of aesthetic regulation.298 As
outlined above in Chapter Four, fifteen of the nineteen states identified through the search
parameters would not recognize zoning on the basis of aesthetic considerations alone.299 One
state, however, demonstrated a conflicted view of aesthetic and historic zoning, suggesting that
where such regulations also served to promote economic health, they would be valid. The results
generated for the three other states were largely irrelevant to the question being posed by this
Thesis.300
The cases from the sixteen relevant states revealed a general consensus that aesthetic
considerations alone could not serve as the justification for a zoning ordinance.301 Some courts
went further stating that aesthetics could never serve as a justification for zoning ordinances.
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Other courts suggested ordinances properly grounded in health, safety, or welfare justifications
would not be declared invalid simply because they also touched on aesthetic concerns. Similarly,
some courts held that it was proper to consider aesthetic implications, but only if the ordinance
could independently be upheld on other grounds. Cases from Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Louisiana provided particularly interesting insights into the state of aesthetic
zoning prior to Berman.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, for example, specifically overturned the opinion of
the trial judge in Barney and Casey v. Milton, because that judge upheld a zoning ordinance on
the basis of aesthetic considerations.302 The trial judge had determined that if a district located
near the entrance to the town were zoned as commercial, the commercial buildings “may well
give one approaching the town a wrong impression of the residential character of the town.”303
The Supreme Court, however, noted that such an aesthetic consideration could not be used as the
basis of a zoning ordinance.304 In a statement that is very relevant to the application of historic
zoning later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court further noted that “[r]egard for the preservation
of the natural beauty of a neighborhood makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but
does not itself give vitality to the regulation.”305
The Court of Appeals of New York made a similar finding in Dowsey v. Village of
Kensington.306 In that case, the city had adopted a zoning ordinance that zoned nearly the entire
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city exclusively as a single family detached residential zone.307 The court found that this
ordinance was adopted with the apparent intention “of providing a beautiful and dignified village
frontage on the public thoroughfare.”308 While noting that such considerations “need not be
disregarded in the formulation of regulations to promote the public welfare,” the court
nonetheless held that even the widest extension of the police power could not be used to justify
an ordinance with purely aesthetic considerations.309 Thus, the high courts of both New York and
Massachusetts specifically held that the police power cannot be used to embrace ordinances that
have the sole purpose of providing a more beautiful village frontage.
Similarly, 122 Main Street v. Brockton dealt with issues that are quite analogous to
historic zoning.310 In interpreting the contemporary zooning enabling act, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court approvingly quoted earlier cases for the proposition that the police power cannot
be exercised for purely aesthetic reasons.311 In this specific case, the court determined that a
minimum height ordinance was invalid under the enabling act and prior aesthetic
jurisprudence.312 In reaching its holding, the court specifically rejected the city’s argument that
the ordinance was necessary “to ensure a reasonable permanency to the character of the districts
in conformity with its initial establishment.”313 In rejecting that argument, the court stated that
“[i]t is not within the scope of the [enabling] act to enact zoning regulations for the purpose of
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assisting a municipality to retain or assume a general appearance deemed to be ideal, or to inflate
its taxable revenue.”314 Further, the court noted that
where legislation seeks to force land to remain vacant unless the
owner will erect a structure of at least two stories . . . or will not
permit him to remodel an existing structure except under the same
conditions, the general benefit to the community must be
something more tangible and less nebulous than any supposed
advantages which the city has been able to bring forward in this
case.315
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly found that an ordinance establishing
minimum lot sizes was unconstitutional as an invalid use of the police power. In Appeal of
Medinger, the court strongly declared that neither aesthetic considerations nor the protection of
property values nor the protection of the local economy had any relation to promoting the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of a community.316 In short, the court denounced the
proposition that the police power could be used to deny a property owner rights in his property
for purely aesthetic considerations. Moreover, neither aesthetics nor the conservation of
economic or property value fell within the scope of the general welfare.317 Again in two further
cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an owner could not be deprived by zoning of
the right to either erect a radio tower or construct a filling station, simply because those uses
offended the aesthetic sensibilities of others.318
The major exception to this general rule comes from a 1953 Louisiana Case in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld what was essentially a historic zoning ordinance that preserved
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the appearance of the Vieux Carre district of New Orleans.319 The court upheld the ordinance
because the Constitution of Louisiana had been amended to specifically provide for its
creation.320 However, the court also noted that the ordinance would tend to promote tourism, and
therefore, the commercial value of the city.321 Nonetheless, the court did note in passing that
“[p]erhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant an imposition of the several
restrictions contained in the Vieux Carre Commission Ordinance.”322 The Louisiana court,
therefore, was unique in generally recognizing that such ordinances were within the scope of the
police power, prior to Berman. In recognizing the validity, however, the court did note that the
Louisiana Constitution and the ordinance “recite that preservation is for the public welfare.”323
While, therefore, this decision came down prior to Berman, it nonetheless did use the same
justification for historic zoning as Berman did for urban renewal; that is, a broader definition of
public welfare.324
Nonetheless, despite Louisiana’s position, these highlighted cases together demonstrate a
general rule that prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Berman, aesthetic
considerations alone could not be used as the basis for zoning ordinances.325 Moreover, the cases
have interesting parallels to historic zoning, which strongly indicate that historic zoning would
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have generally been suspect prior to Berman.326 The ordinances at issue in these cases seemed to
have the objective of preserving the existing physical environment of the city and prohibiting any
land uses that were deemed in opposition to the apparent existing beauty of the cities. The
ordinances sought to preserve the appearance of city centers by prohibiting single story
structures, to ensure aesthetically pleasing village frontages, to preserve the character of the town
as initially existed, or to maintain the general residential character of certain districts. The courts
consistently noted that these objectives could not be accomplished through the use of the police
power. While the courts noted that these aesthetic considerations could be auxiliary to the
primary purpose of the ordinances, they could not serve as the basis.
Considering that many of the invalidated ordinances sought to preserve the existing
aesthetic fabric of their jurisdiction, it is likely that courts would have similarly rejected
ordinances that were based on preserving historic structures or districts for aesthetic reasons.
Moreover, the language used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggests that even had such
aesthetic ordinances also served to preserve property values, they would have still been invalid.
This further point indicates an early reluctance to extend the police power or the concept of the
general welfare so as to include economic considerations. Recognizing a more limited scope for
the police power, the court consistently held that regulations must bear some relationship to the
public health, safety, or welfare to be valid. Aesthetic considerations did not fall into this rubric.
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Again, this conclusion is made on the basis of cases herein identified. Circumstances
obviously would vary by state, especially depending on specific enabling legislation. Cf. infra
notes 319-24 and accompanying text (discussing the state of the law in Louisiana prior to
Berman). Nonetheless the conclusions drawn here do indicate a general reluctance on the part of
courts to extend the police power so as to include aesthetic considerations (and presumably had
the issue arisen, historic zoning) alone.
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Similarly, it is quite likely that most courts would have held that historic zoning also did not fall
into this rubric, as existed prior to Berman.
D. Overview following Berman
As outlined above in Chapter Five, the search for cases relating to historic zoning
ordinances following Berman but prior to Penn Central returned forty five cases from the high
courts of nineteen states that also returned results prior to Berman.327 Nine of the nineteen state
high courts identified issued opinions directly applicable to the question posed by this Thesis; the
results generated for the ten other states were largely irrelevant to the question.328
Connecticut recognized a generally broad view of the general welfare and police power,
but would not extend it to solely aesthetic considerations.329 Virginia invalidated design review
restrictions, stating that the police power cannot be used for aesthetics alone.330 Washington
found that in an environmental context, the police power could be used to protect aesthetics
when it also protected against economic loss.331 New York did not rule directly on the validity of
aesthetic or historic zoning regulations, but had a strong dissent that suggested it was time to
adopt an aesthetics alone rule.332 Pennsylvania recognized the validity of historic zoning per the
state constitution, and cited Berman for the proposition that the concept of the general welfare
encompasses aesthetics, but nonetheless would not recognize that aesthetics alone could justify
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use of the police power.333 Maryland held that regulation could not be used to create aesthetically
pleasing results, but could be used to preserve aesthetically pleasing or historic sites.334
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and New Hampshire found historic and aesthetic zoning to be valid
exercises of the police power per language in Berman.335 Together, these cases identified reveal a
mixed reaction to and use of the Supreme Court’s decision in Berman, as relates to historic
zoning.
The New York case Lutheran Church v. New York is somewhat irrelevant to the
discussion in this Thesis, because the direct issue was a takings challenge to landmark
designation.336 Therefore, the majority did not need to rule on the general validity of historic
zoning to reach its conclusion that a takings had occurred.337 The case is highlighted here,
however, because two dissenters expressed the sentiment that “perhaps it is time that aesthetics
took its place as a zoning and Independently cognizable under the police power.”338 The dissent
further noted how such a recognition would “be but a moderate analogical extension” of existing
precedent.339
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. and City of Baltimore v. Center Parking, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland generally discussed the validity of aesthetic-based regulations
when striking down two separate ordinances relating to the prohibition of billboards and painted
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signs. 340 In Center Parking, the earlier case, the court found that the near total prohibition of
painted signs, but not billboards, was an arbitrary use of the police power.341 This decision,
however, did not require the court to rule directly on the issue of ordinances based solely on
aesthetics.342
Three years later in Mano Swartz, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
where an ordinance has “as its sole purpose the achievement of an aesthetically pleasing result,”
it is not within the permissible scope of the police power.343 The court found that a sign
ordinance which established guidelines and embowered a sign commission to enact rules and
regulations to ensure the attractiveness of signs was invalid, because it only sought to achieve an
aesthetically pleasing result.344 As with earlier cases, the court noted that aesthetic goals may be
considered only when the ordinance primarily served other ends traditionally associated with the
police power, such as health, safety, morals, and welfare.345
While the court was strict with its aesthetic only zoning language, it went on to discuss
the preservation and protection of aesthetically pleasing areas, such as historic districts, even
though seemingly unnecessary to the holding.346 The court seemed to distinguish between the
ordinance at issue which sought to establish controls for future signage and other ordinances
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which sought to preserve historic or aesthetically significant areas.347 Indeed, the court
specifically stated that “the police power may rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is
generally regarded by the public to be pleasing to the eye or historically or architecturally
significant.”348
In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, the Connecticut Supreme Court would not
directly hold that aesthetics alone could justify the use of the police power.349 Nonetheless, the
court upheld the validity of a historic district ordinance and affirmed the denial of a certificate to
demolition a structure within a historic district.350 After quoting from Berman, the court
determined that “the preservation of an area or cluster of buildings with exceptional historical
and architectural significance may serve the public welfare.”351 The court also seemed to
recognize that historic zoning involved aesthetic considerations. Plaintiffs had argued that the
ordinance was improperly “vague aesthetic legislation;” however, the court noted that the
historic ordinance’s aesthetic considerations were not in fact vague, because the ordinance laid
out specific factors to be considered for the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness.352 The
court then went on to note that the full extent of the relationship between the police power and
aesthetics was not yet a settled question.353 Despite its apparent hesitation to recognize the
validity of ordinances on aesthetic grounds alone, the court nonetheless upheld the validity of a
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historic ordinance, at least in part, due to language in Berman stating that the public welfare
encompasses aesthetics and that the legislature has the power to determine that a community
should be beautiful.354
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached similar conclusions, as to aesthetic zoning, in
the cases it decided. In 1965, when invalidating an ordinance establishing minimum lot sizes, the
court specifically stated that zoning may not be sustained with solely aesthetic justifications.355
However, in a 1958 case, the court held that the designation of a structure with twenty two rooms
and seven baths as single family residential was not an invalid exercise of the police power,
because the legislature possessed the power to regulate to create an attractive community.356
In reaching this holding, the court noted that historic zoning had elsewhere been upheld
under a broad concept of the general welfare.357 It extended that broad concept of the general
welfare to the present case, finding that “the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a
community [is] a proper element of the general welfare.”358 In extending the scope of the general
welfare and the police power, the court approvingly quoted Berman and went on to state that
“[i]f the legislature has the power to compel a property owner to submit to a forced sale for the
purposes of creating an attractive community, it has the power to regulate his property for such
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objectives.”359 With that statement, the court seemed to hold that aesthetic zoning was a proper
exercise of the police power. By extension, it would seem that under this language, historic
zoning was also proper given that it serves to preserve attractive characteristics of the
community. The court ultimately noted that as it was “unable to say that requiring the appellant
to use her property in conformance with the provisions of the zoning ordinance would not serve
to preserve the attractive characteristics of the community and the property values therein.
Therefore, the attack upon . . . the ordinance . . . must fail.”360
Finally, the courts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico all followed the
rationale presented in Berman in upholding the validity of historic zoning laws. In John Donnelly
& Sons, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the locality’s decision to deny plaintiff’s
permit for off-premises outdoor advertising signs and explicitly concluded “that aesthetics alone
may justify the exercise of the police power; that within the broad concept of ‘general welfare,’
cities and towns may enact reasonable bill-board regulations designed to preserve and improve
their physical environment.”361 The court also directly cited language in Berman for the
proposition “that the general welfare embraces aesthetic considerations.”362 Further, the court
found that while Berman discussed the general welfare with reference to eminent domain, the
same view could be applied to zoning.363 In making this determination, the Massachusetts court
also cited to an Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, noting that it had previously recognized the
tendency to give more weight to aesthetic considerations when it had generally determined
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historic zoning to be constitutional.364 The court thus seemingly recognized a congruous
relationship among eminent domain, the police power, aesthetic zoning, and historic zoning.
Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Court directly recognized the constitutionality of
historic zoning in answering questions posed by the Massachusetts Senate.365 In concluding that
historic zoning was within the proper scope of the police power, the court first noted that historic
zoning did not relate to public health, safety, or morality.366 Nonetheless, the court continued by
stating that aesthetics could be given a stronger consideration in light of Berman.367 The court
applied the language of Berman and reasoned that because “incongruous structures” could
destroy the historic character of the town, the police power could be exercised to regulate for the
preservation of the historic character.368 In short, the broad concept of the police power and
general welfare adopted in Berman seemed to strongly influence the Massachusetts Supreme
Court that historic zoning was valid.
Likewise, in Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
an ordinance requiring a certain window size to be used for structures within a historic district
was a valid exercise of the police power.369 The court discussed the two Opinions of the Justices
to the Senate, issued by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and ultimately held that “the Santa Fe
historical zoning ordinance [was] within the term ‘general welfare.’”370 Interestingly, the court
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seemed to distinguish historic zoning from purely aesthetic zoning and thus found it unnecessary
to determine whether aesthetic considerations alone could justify the exercise of the police
power, as suggested by Berman.371 The court did, however, recognize the importance of aesthetic
considerations to historic zoning and suggested that, because the historic ordinance in question
had comprehensive architectural control requirements, the ordinance was not arbitrary or
unreasonable.372 Therefore, while it attempted to distinguish historic and aesthetic zoning, the
court nonetheless discussed the strong relationship between the two and ultimately upheld the
historic ordinance in general accordance with the opinions issued by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, which in turn relied largely on Berman in upholding the constitutionality of historic
zoning ordinances.373
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the validity of a local regulation
that, in order to maintain the atmosphere of the town, prohibited the erection of structures within
a quarter mile of the Town Common without prior approval from the town board.374 The
regulation in question, therefore, was very analogous to standard historic zoning practices that
generally require a certificate of appropriateness prior to the construction, alteration, or
demolition of structures within certain districts.375 In upholding the regulations, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of “preserving the value of the historic
buildings about the common” was a valid basis for the exercise of the police power and “too well
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established to be open to question.”376 The court was hesitant to sustain the regulation solely
upon aesthetic considerations; however it did recognizing that the preservation of the
attractiveness of a community fell within the general welfare.377 It further noted that the
regulation was not invalid because it was motivated in part by aesthetic and historic preservation
considerations.378 Ultimately, the court upheld the ordinance, approvingly cited from the
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, and noted that the town
would not be able to maintain its atmosphere if “incongruous” structures were permitted near the
Town Common.379 Again, by following the rationale laid out in Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, the court essentially followed the rationale established in Berman. In short, a common
nexus among cases upholding historic or aesthetic zoning regulations is that they relied on the
broad concept of the general welfare and police power as laid out in Berman.
E. Comparison
Following Berman but prior to Penn Central, the high courts of Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire all began to change their opinion
on aesthetic zoning (and by extension historic zoning) following Berman. Furthermore, the New
Mexico Supreme Court, which did not rule on aesthetic zoning prior to Berman,380 upheld a
historic zoning ordinance based on the Berman rationale. While it is perhaps improper to lay the
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validation of historic zoning solely at the feet of Berman, the cases discussed herein clearly show
that Berman had a strong effect on both aesthetic and historic zoning.
The jurisprudence prior to Berman indicates that until roughly the midcentury, there was
a strong consensus that the police power could not be used for aesthetic purposes, and by
extension likely could not be used for solely historic zoning purposes. The only major exception
was found in Louisiana. There, the state high court upheld what was essentially a historic zoning
ordinance prior to Berman, noting that it tended to promote tourism in addition to protecting the
attractiveness of the community.381 Nonetheless, the court seemed hesitant to declare that
aesthetic considerations alone could justify the use of the police power.382
Following Berman, however, courts began to routinely uphold aesthetic and historic
zoning regulations. In so doing, they usually cited Berman’s determination that public welfare is
a broad concept, that public welfare includes aesthetic values, and that the police power can be
used “to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy.”383 As noted
above, the courts of at least five states even went so far as to shift away from precedent prior to
Berman and to generally adopt a broad definition of the general welfare that was inclusive of
aesthetics and historic preservation. Even the United States Supreme Court adopted Berman’s
language in generally recognizing the validity of historic zoning and landmark ordinances in
Penn Central.384 Therein, the Court cited Berman and noted that “States and cities may enact
land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and
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desirable aesthetic features of a city.”385 The Court then recognized that the New York landmark
ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, similar to historic zoning, because it
“embodie[d] a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest
wherever they might be found in the city.”386 Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Berman did
work to provide a justification for aesthetic and historic zoning.
Although urban renewal programs had been in place for several years prior to Berman, it
was the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case that placed the ultimate stamp of
legal approval on urban renewal programs. Through its holding, the Court determined that the
use of eminent domain to condemn both blighted property and unblighted property that was
situated within a redevelopment zone was a valid use of eminent domain.387 In so doing,
however, the Court intertwined the limitations of eminent domain with those of the police
power.388 The Court further determined that the police power was broad and could be used to
provide for an aesthetically pleasing, beautiful community.389 Thereafter, courts adopted that
language in upholding aesthetic and historic zoning statutes. The broad scope of the general
welfare and the police power was used to uphold both urban renewal programs and historic
zoning ordinances. Therefore, it would seem that there are indeed fundamental legal similarities
between the two programs.
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F. Further Implications
The jurisprudential comparison between urban renewal, through Berman, and historic
zoning has raised further interesting implications for local regulations and planning strategies
beyond historic zoning and urban renewal. A major implication of historic zoning, and aesthetic
zoning in general, is the tension between such regulations and the free speech provisions of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.390 Both zoning strategies, by nature, restrict
property owners from freely altering the exterior of their properties. For example, under such
regulations, an owner may be unable to commission artwork for the side of the regulated
building without first obtaining a certificate of appropriateness from the local zoning board.
Likewise, if a property owner wishes to express himself through erecting a structure with a
certain architectural style or altering his existing structure to a new style, he may likewise be
required to first seek a certificate of appropriateness. If the artwork or architectural style
proposed by the landowner is deemed incompatible with the historic nature of the district, his
First Amendment speech rights could be infringed.391
A further implication of this jurisprudential research is the potential for comparison
among urban renewal tactics, historic zoning, aesthetic zoning, and other zoning regulations that
move beyond the scope of simple Euclidean zoning. Traditional Euclidean style zoning first
arose, theoretically, to combat nuisances before they began by separating, for example, industrial
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from residential land uses.392 However, zoning for aesthetics and historic districts pushed zoning
beyond the traditional nuisance prevention model. The analysis comparing historic zoning and
aesthetic zoning to urban renewal can thus provide insights into other zoning methods that go
beyond Euclidean zoning. The strongest comparison to draw is probably to form based zoning.
Form based zoning is a zoning strategy that seeks to regulate the physical environment
beyond simply separating land uses.393 Form based zoning goes further by regulating heights,
setbacks, facades, and outdoor spaces for the sake of creating an aesthetically pleasing physical
environment, in addition to one that is generally pedestrian friendly and human-scaled.
Especially given the influence of new urbanism and popularity of planning for walkable, humanscaled environments, it is important to determine how exactly the police power is being justified
to advance these goals.
Form based zoning is necessarily related to aesthetic zoning, and tangentially related to
historic zoning, for example where it may be used to help recapture the historic “feel” of a given
urban area. As with historic zoning, form based zoning has the laudable objective of creating a
visually pleasing and pragmatic, human centered urban environment. However, to the extent that
form based zoning is based on an expansive understanding of the police power, it is legally
related to the unpopular urban renewal programs of the Twentieth Century.
Finally, the expanding conception of the general welfare and the police power raises the
threat that eminent domain could be used to condemn and transfer property in order to develop
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aesthetically pleasing, historically authentic, or walkable environments. This concern arises from
the United States Supreme Court’s determination in Berman that the scope of eminent domain
and the police power are essentially coterminous. As courts shift to an expansive definition of the
general welfare and an expansive understanding of the police power, it is possible that the use of
eminent domain could follow suit. If this is the case, cities will essentially relive urban renewal
programs, the difference being that now they would seek to create more traditional urban
environments rather than modern environments. Whatever the environment sought, however, the
use of eminent domain to achieve those objectives will necessarily result in displacement of city
residents who live in the development zones.394
Moreover if, as the Berman court stated, eminent domain is merely a means to an end and
is permissible essentially whenever police power action is permissible, the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution would effectively be dead letter. If the police power should
continue to expand in scope to encompass more subjective regulations, such as form based
regulations, it is only logical to deduce that the use of eminent domain could also be expanded to
facilitate the creation of certain urban forms. Or, expanding on Justice Rehnquist’s concern in
Penn Central,395 legislatures could merely require the repair or renovation of structures in
conformance with certain urban design codes. In such an instance, results could possibly prove
even worse than those generated by urban renewal programs. Such requirements could cause
displacement, because, to avoid possible penalties, lower income homeowners in historic or
urban design districts would be forced to relocate if they were unable to keep a property in good
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repair or in compliance with form based codes. In such a situation, based on the majority holding
in Penn Central, these dislocated individuals would possibly not even receive the compensation
that they would have received had they been dislocated by an urban renewal project.
Divorced from the limitations of an earlier understanding of the police power and a preBerman eminent domain jurisprudence, the law making bodies of state or local governments
could effectively exercise near total control over private property within their jurisdictions. Such
an outcome would likely create results even more detrimental than those of mid-Twentieth
Century urban renewal, especially given that regulating for aesthetics alone is inherently
subjective and much less concrete than even regulating for the abatement of blight as was the
case with urban renewal legislation.
It is not impossible to imagine a return to such earlier jurisprudence in states that
subsequently expanded the scope of the police power in accordance with Berman. Still, such a
return could possibly encounter problems if these states had constitutional or statutory provisions
specifically declaring that aesthetic or historic zoning fell within the scope of the police
power.396 In such an instance, deferential courts would likely be unable to return to a pre-Berman
scope of the police power without evidence of a conflicting constitutional or statutory provision.
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VII.

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO HISTORIC ZONING

While historic zoning may seem relatively benign and have admirable objectives, this
research has indicated that historic zoning has strong underlying legal ties to the relatively
unpopular urban renewal programs of the Twentieth Century. A locality can choose to protect its
historic sites or to condemn and redevelop districts; whatever the choice, however, the
underlying authority to do so derives from an expansive scope of the police power. It is
important to recognize that such an expansive scope may be used to either preserve or destroy,
and that either option may result in negative consequences such as displacement in addition to
any positive outcomes. Given that an expansive police power may be used with laudable
intentions but result in negative outcomes, it may be wise to return to an earlier, more limited
understanding of the power so as to avoid the potential for revival of urban renewal or further
erosion of an owner’s security in his property.397
If courts returned to an earlier, limited understanding of the police power, however, could
historic structures and districts still be preserved? As many have noted, the preservation of
historic structures does provide benefit to the community, but is it possible to capture that benefit
without resorting to regulations that restrict owners in the use of their property and raise the
specter of urban renewal? A few alternatives that could achieve the benefits of historic zoning
without the negative threats are discussed below.398
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A. Private Preservation
Perhaps the simplest alternative to historic zoning is to encourage the voluntary
preservation of historic sites by private organizations. Indeed, there is precedent for this strategy.
Prior to the advent of historic zoning, private groups formed to protect the nation’s vulnerable
historic sites. The earliest, and perhaps most famous, example is the Mount Vernon Ladies
Association’s preservation of Mount Vernon. After both the Virginia and federal governments
declined to, this wholly private organization purchased Mount Vernon in order to repair it and
preserve it for posterity.399 Moreover, in the mid-Twentieth Century, the Association purchased
lands adjacent to Mount Vernon in order to preserve in perpetuity the views from the
plantation.400 A comprehensive private restoration and preservation effort was also undertaken in
Williamsburg, Virginia by the Rockefeller Family and continuing with the non-profit Colonial
Williamsburg Foundation.401 The private actors obtained title to historic sites in and around
Williamsburg in order to restore and preserve a district that had fallen into disrepair.402 The
entire site now operates as a living history museum open to the public.403
A criticism of solely relying on grand private preservation efforts undertaken by
philanthropic organizations could be that such efforts only represent the Monumentalism style of

399

See Phelps, supra note 3, at 117; NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION AN
INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 29-30, 60 (2d ed. 2009); Ann Pamela
Cunningham, Phoebe Apperson Hearst, and Frances Payne Bolton, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S
MOUNT VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/content/ann-pamela-cunningham-phoebeapperson-hearst-and-frances-payne-bolton (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
400
See Pamela Cunningham, Phoebe Apperson Hearst, and Frances Payne Bolton, supra
note 399.
401
See Phelps, supra note 3, at 118-19; see also The History of Colonial Williamsburg,
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUNDATION, http://www.history.org/Foundation/cwhistory.cfm (last
visited Apr. 28, 2014).
402
See The History of Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 401.
403
See id.
82

historic preservation. That is, only sites of great cultural or historic value are preserved, and the
protection of general vernacular structures in old and historic districts is not ensured. Such a
criticism would raise questions as to the nature and extent of historic preservation in general.
This concern, however, could largely be mitigated by recognizing that private preservation need
not rely solely on the large scale efforts by philanthropic organizations. Private preservation can
also occur spontaneously by property owners who seek to preserve the character of their
structures or neighborhoods, either individually or collectively. Such strategies are discussed
below.
B. Easements404
An easement is a non-possessory interest in land that grants certain rights to either use or
prohibit certain uses of the land in question. Easements were a Common Law device that
predated organized preservation movements; however, they are applicable to preservation
purposes. While easements exist at Common Law, many states have adopted statutes that
specifically permit the creation of a device known generally as a conservation easement, which
can be used to preserve historic sites or open spaces. Such easements are generally freely
transferable and serve to restrict or prohibit alterations to land in perpetuity. The terms of
individual easements will vary; however, they generally entitle the easement holder to review of
plans to repair or alter structures on the encumbered land. Moreover, the easements can usually
bring tax benefits to the individual whose land is encumbered in the form of deductions, credits,
or abatements.
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The primary benefits to historic preservation through easements are that no coercion is
involved and the easements generate tax benefits. Land owners are essentially free to negotiate
for the extent of the easement; however, to obtain the tax benefits, the easement must meet
certain requirements. In the historic preservation context, an easement could be applied only to
the façade of a historic structure, prohibiting the owner from altering the façade, but allowing
him to freely alter the interior.405
Easements, however, do present their own problems within the preservation context. 406
First, the easements are usually perpetual. The easements, therefore, would bind future owners of
the land who never negotiated for, or received direct benefit from, the easement. Second, the
approval process for repairs or alterations could prove to be just as cumbersome under a
conservation easement as under a traditional zoning device. This is especially true if the holder
of the easement is either a government entity or a quasi-public entity, potentially bound by
constitutional and statutory requirements. Third, easements are capable tools for ensuring the
preservation of a discrete property; however, their use in protecting whole historic districts is
limited and would involve higher transaction costs as each owner in a district would need to
individually transfer an easement.
A full discussion of the consequences of and strategies regarding easements is beyond the
scope of this Thesis. Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine revisions to conservation easement
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statutes and tax law that could serve to ameliorate these problems. First, tax rules could be
altered to allow non-perpetual or rolling term easements to receive tax benefits. Moreover, state
codes could be amended to specifically allow the transfer of easements to wholly private, nonprofit entities in an attempt to avoid the potential pit fall of de facto zoning presented by public
or quasi-public ownership of easements.407
C. Voluntary Preservation Associations
Finally, the preservation of historic structures and neighborhoods could also be
accomplished through the use of neighborhood homeowners associations.408 Essentially, the
owners of properties in a given neighborhood could freely choose to form a non-profit
neighborhood association and agree to be bound by the restrictions, bylaws, and rulings of the
association.409
The principle is similar to that of standard homeowners associations often found in
neighborhoods constructed by a common developer. Within the context of historic preservation,
however, the associations could form in existing neighborhoods and serve the sole function of
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providing for the common preservation of the historical character and aesthetic of the
neighborhood. The association would be formed by property owners within a given
neighborhood, and would only bind those properties whose owners are association members.
That is, all owners in a neighborhood would be free to either opt into or remain independent from
the association’s bylaws. Precedent for such an association exists. For example, the Code of
Texas specifically contemplates the creation of such associations, styled “historic neighborhood
preservation associations.”410
As with easements, the primary benefit to the voluntary preservation association
alternative is that it enables individual property owners to freely choose whether or not to
encumber their property with restrictions. Unlike easements, however, the creation of a
neighborhood association responsible for historic preservation could help to enable the
protection of whole neighborhoods rather than mere collections of discrete properties.
The voluntary preservation association alternative also has the virtue of truly facilitating
local, grass roots decision-making. Within the traditional historic zoning framework,
neighborhoods and properties can generally be designated as historic and encumbered by
regulatory requirements or process without the express consent of affected property owners.411
The use of neighborhood associations, however, whose membership would be optional to each
property owner within the neighborhood, empowers individual citizens to choose if the benefits
of preserving historic character for their properties and their neighborhood outweigh the costs.
Furthermore, when owners find the need to repair, rebuild, or otherwise alter their property, they
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411
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would not need to traverse the costly “red tape” of city hall.412 Rather, owners would engage
directly with fellow neighborhood residents in seeking authority to act.413
As historic preservation has laudable objectives and is fairly popular, at least in the
abstract, there is no reason to think that property owners would summarily reject rules that
maintained the historic character of their properties and neighborhood, especially if they had a
strong and effective say in adoption and enforcement of the rules. Indeed, many home owners
already agree to voluntarily accept restrictions on their property in the form of traditional
homeowners associations. A voluntary preservation association could result in the protection of,
or increase in, property values found with official historic designation, without an accompanying
governmental regulatory framework.414
Finally, the voluntary preservation association alternative could be combined with the use
of conservation easements. In such a scenario, the association would not necessarily enact
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For example, in the City of Richmond, Virginia, “[a] certificate of appropriateness
shall be required for all alterations to a building, structure, or site which is subject to a public
view.” CITY OF RICHMOND, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 114, § 114-930.6(f) (2014). While
the actual first time application for a COA does not require payment of a fee, the applicant is
required to submit twelve physical copies of all required supporting documentation in addition to
a digital copy. See City of Richmond Commission of Architectural Review, Application
Submission Requirements, available at
http://www.richmondgov.com/content/CommissionArchitecturalReview/forms/CAR_Submissio
nApplicationRequirements.pdf. Required supporting documentation may include: site plans,
sections, or elevations; a materials list; a colors list; and historic documentary evidence. See id.
For a discussion on the negative effects of red tape on urbanism in general, see Andres Duany,
The Pink Zone: Why Detroit is the New Brooklyn, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:09 PM),
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2014/01/30/the-pink-zone-why-detroit-is-the-newbrooklyn/.
413
It is not unreasonable to conclude that individual property owners and the
neighborhood as a whole would have more complete information than city hall, and therefore
better decision-making capabilities, when determining what should or should not be done in their
neighborhood.
414
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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restrictions to ensure the preservation of members’ historic properties. Rather, members could
donate historic conservation easements on their property to the association. The primary benefit
to enabling the neighborhood association to hold the easement is that the process for seeking
permission to alter or repair a property would, theoretically, be simpler than if the easement were
held by a public or quasi-public agency. Furthermore, as the neighborhood association would be
the body approving the alterations or repairs, decision-making would be kept at the most local
level, empowering residents in the process and ideally encouraging participation in the decisionmaking process.415
There are, however, potential downsides to the voluntary association alternative. First,
there could be some initial difficulty in forming the association. Formation of a homeowners
association is often undertaken at or around the time of the initial development of the
neighborhood.416 Similarly, the ability of the association to provide for the preservation of the
entire neighborhood could be thwarted by individual property owners who did not want to
restrict their use of their property.417 The potential that some owners would not join the
association, thus thwarting full comprehensive protection of the neighborhood, will always be a
potential downside due to the voluntary nature of the association. However, direct economic
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To ensure that the residents, through the neighborhood association, are always in fact
the individuals making the determinations, the easements could be made non-transferrable to
third parties.
416
For example, when selling properties to the initial residents, the developer includes
covenants in the deeds that provide for membership in and adherence to bylaws of a homeowners
association.
417
This problem could be considered as a “free rider problem.” That is, if most of the
neighborhood agreed to restrictions that preserved the overall historic character, a single hold out
property owner could receive any potential benefits, such as general community attractiveness or
even property value protection, without paying for that benefit himself by similarly agreeing to
encumber his own property. See Phelps, supra note 3, at 149 & n.214 (noting that voluntary
historic districts could face the classic free-rider problem).
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incentives could be tailored to help address this problem. A possible strategy to mitigate these
downsides could be for local governments to provide a property tax abatement or for the state
and federal governments to provide an income tax deduction or credit for owners who join the
association and agree to be bound by the restrictions and bylaws. Such incentives could help to
encourage neighborhood residents to in fact form and join a neighborhood preservation
association.
A further potential downside to voluntary associations is the threat of existing members
leaving the association, thereby presenting difficulties to enforcement of a common
neighborhood preservation scheme. If an owner could simply leave the association when he
desired to pursue an alteration or repair against the association’s common scheme, enforcement
would be near impossible. This potential downside could, however, be addressed with traditional
contractual obligations and remedies. Depending on the terms of the association’s articles of
incorporation or bylaws, an injunction or other action for breach of contract could hypothetically
be brought against the leaving member.
While the voluntary preservation association alternative has potential downsides and will
not be able to fully recreate the effect of historic zoning regulations, any such downsides must be
weighed against the beneficial aspects of deregulation and voluntary preservation. The
encouragement of private, voluntary preservation allows citizens, both individually and
collectively through neighborhood associations, to conduct their own evaluation of the costs and
benefits of preservation. Allowing citizens the ability to make such determinations themselves
has the virtue of empowering individuals and neighborhoods in addition to that of encouraging
decision-making at the most local level.
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Keeping this decision-making power local and decentralized among the many residents
of a neighborhood, whether individually or through collective voting through a neighborhood
association, will also likely facilitate adaptation to the change in neighborhood conditions over
time. Neighborhoods are organic, and a change in conditions is inevitable as residents move in or
out, demographics shift, attitudes change, local employment opportunities rise or fall, and the
needs and desires of residents change.
Any wise preservation strategy should be prepared to address such a change in
conditions. Similarly, strategies must recognize that preservation will ultimately be a multigenerational issue as the underlying land may remain static, but residents and their desired land
uses will not. Providing for truly local decision-making empowers those most sensitive to the
needs and changing conditions of their community to preserve or adapt historic structures as
necessity demands, without first seeking approval from a centralized third-party that may lack
such sensitivity. Ultimately, the voluntary preservation association alternative protects against
the underlying threats of urban renewal that the legal justifications for historic zoning present. It
also, however, encourages the preservation of historic structures while providing the added
benefit of empowering neighborhood residents to determine for themselves when changing
conditions necessitate alteration and adaptation.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Thesis has attempted to demonstrate that there is a fundamental connection between
the underlying legal principles of historic zoning and urban renewal. To that end, the
jurisprudence involving historic zoning before and after the seminal urban renewal case of
Berman v. Parker has been collected and analyzed. As the initial search used herein did not
identify cases involving historic zoning prior to Berman, the search was expanded to include
cases involving aesthetic zoning, which is closely related to historic zoning.418
An analysis of the jurisprudence indicated that prior to Berman courts were more likely to
adopt a limited view of the police power and the concept of the general welfare. Specifically, the
high courts of fourteen of the nineteen states identified would generally strike down ordinances
that sought to regulate solely for aesthetic purposes. In so doing courts noted that the exercise of
the police power must relate to public health, safety, morals, or welfare. The courts recognized
the value of aesthetics, but would not find that aesthetics alone provided a justifiable grounding
in health, safety, morals, or welfare. Given the close relationship between aesthetic zoning and
historic zoning, it generally seems as though courts would have also been reluctant to recognize
zoning for purely historic purposes prior to Berman. For example, in 1949 the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts stated that “[r]egard for the preservation of the natural beauty of a neighborhood
makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but does not itself give vitality to the
regulation.”419
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion in Berman v. Parker.
In that case, the Court generally upheld the validity of comprehensive urban renewal programs,
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See supra Chapter III; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Mass.1949).

the programs that were later recognized to have quite negative consequences.420 The Court
upheld urban renewal programs by essentially determining that the power of eminent domain and
the police power were coterminous. In making this determination, the Court also noted that the
scope of the police power was very broad and that the concept of the public welfare
encompassed aesthetics. Therefore, the Court stated that legislatures had the power to determine
that their communities be beautiful as well as safe. With that language, the Court effectively
expanded the scope of the police power.
Thereafter, an analysis of the jurisprudence following Berman indicated that courts were
more likely to uphold aesthetic or historic zoning ordinances. Specifically, the high courts of five
states seemed to move away from their positions prior to Berman and instead cited Berman for
the proposition that aesthetic and historic zoning were valid exercises of the police power. For
example, in a 1955 opinion, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts cited Berman and noted that
“[t]here is reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic considerations than
was given to them [in the early twentieth century].”421 It then noted that, because construction of
“incongruous structures” could destroy the historic character of the town, historic zoning
ordinances fell within the scope of the police power.422
The research undertaken pursuant to this Thesis focused on the inquiry as to the
jurisprudential connection between urban renewal and historic zoning. It ultimately indicated that
there is a connection between the two programs. The cases identified by the search in this Thesis
ultimately indicated that Berman had an impact on the acceptance of aesthetic and historic
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See supra Chapters II, IV.B.
Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Mass. 1955).
422
Id. at 562.
421
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zoning. Therefore, it seems as though historic zoning and urban renewal share fundamental legal
roots. That is, both programs are based in an expansive understanding of the police power.
The identification, collection, and analysis of cases here, will hopefully serve future
research by assisting in further analyzing the connections between not only historic zoning and
urban renewal, but also among aesthetic zoning in general, form based zoning, the police power,
eminent domain, and conflicts between zoning and the rights protected by the First
Amendment.423
Given that the legacy of urban renewal is largely negative, and that historic zoning can be
shown to share a legal connection to urban renewal, this Thesis also broadly suggested several
alternatives to traditional historic zoning practices. These alternatives focused on options that
empowered individual residents and owners to personally make historic determinations for
themselves and their neighborhoods.424 Under these alternative systems of preservation, the
planner’s role becomes one of advocacy, support, and facilitation, rather than of centralized
decision-making. Likewise, the land-use attorney’s role becomes one of crafting the legal
protections sought by citizens and neighborhoods, without resorting to regulatory practices and
legal theories that raise the negative threats of urban renewal. By reorienting historic
preservation away from zoning practices based on the same legal principles that justified urban
renewal and towards alternatives that encourage and enable both individual and collective grass
roots decision-making, it could be possible to achieve the beneficial aspects of historic
preservation without the threats inherent to urban renewal programs.
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See supra Chapter VI.F.
See supra Chapter VII.

Appendix A
Table of Cases, decided prior to Berman v. Parker, for the nineteen states identified
Arkansas
Herring v. Stannus, 275 S.W. 321 (Ark. 1924) (“conceding - without deciding – [that the] police
power may not be used for purely aesthetic purposes”).
Powell v. Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1954) (holding that funeral homes may be barred from
residential areas because the continuous suggestion of death destroys the comfort and repose of
home ownership).
California
Feraut v. City of Sacramento, 269 P. 537 (Cal. 1928) (holding that zoning ordinances must be
based on the foundation of protecting public health, safety, morality, or welfare).
City of Beverly Hills v. Brady, 215 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1950) (en banc) (holding that a physician did
not violate a residential zoning ordinance by employing secretaries and publishing medical
pamphlets in a residential zone).
Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (upholding a
prohibition on certain expansions of an oil drilling operation by noting that oil drilling was
specifically declared by law to be detrimental to public health, safety, and welfare).
Connecticut
Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354 (Conn.1920) (upholding setback requirements on the
basis of public health, safety, and welfare).
State v. Kievman, 165 A. 601 (Conn.1933) (licensing of junk yards) (“The situation presented
does not require us to decide whether æsthetic considerations alone would be sufficient to
warrant regulation or restriction.”).
Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1944) (noting that aesthetics alone
cannot serve to justify the use of the police power).
Langbein v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 67 A.2d 5 (Conn. 1949) (certificate of occupancy to use
property as a day school).
Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 81 A.2d 266 (Conn. 1951) (finding that aesthetics alone cannot
justify the prohibition on the display of vehicles for sale).

i

Kansas
Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923) (upholding zoning ordinances providing for the
separation of land uses, because such ordinances protect the health and safety of the public)
(discussing the shifting nature of aesthetic regulations, but not holding that aesthetics alone can
justify the use of the police power).
Heckman v. City of Independence, 274 P. 732 (Kan. 1929) (upholding zoning ordinance that
prohibited service station in residential zone).
City of Wichita v. Schwertner, 286 P. 266 (Kan. 1930) (residential zoning of land previously
held for use as a cemetery did not prohibit the land from being used for cemetery purposes in the
future).
Asmann v. Masters, 98 P.2d 419 (Kan. 1940) (finding that a dance hall is not a nuisance per se,
but that it can become one under certain circumstances).
Louisiana
State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923) (upholding an ordinance that
prohibited businesses in residential districts, because such ordinances affected public health and
safety, in addition to aesthetics) (noting precedent that aesthetic considerations alone cannot
justify use of the police power; however, discussing how the general welfare likely encompasses
aesthetics).
State ex rel Giangrosso v. City of New Orleans, 106 So. 549 (La. 1925) (upholding ordinance
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety).
State ex rel Palma v. City of New Orleans, 109 So. 916 (La. 1926) (upholding ordinance
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety).
State ex rel Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 121 So. 613 (La. 1929) (upholding ordinance
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety) (holding that the continued
operation of a business in violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a public nuisance).
City of New Orleans v. S. Auto Wreckers, 192 So. 523 (La. 1939) (a property use that does “not
offend public morals or jeopardize the health and safety of the public” is legitimate).
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953) (upholding a historic zoning ordinance
under a broad scope of public welfare, because it preserved the character of the city, thus tending
to promote tourism) (noting, however, that aesthetics alone could not likely justify the
ordinance).

ii

Maine
Inhabitants of York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby, 140 A. 382 (Me. 1928) (upholding zoning
ordinance that excluded private camping grounds, because such uses tend to affect public order
and sanitation).
Maryland
Cochran v. Preston, 70 A. 113 (Md.1908) (upholding maximum height restrictions, because they
tend to protect the public from the danger of fire) (but noting that the police power cannot be
used to impair private property rights solely for aesthetic purposes).
Stubbs v. Scott, 95 A. 1060 (Md.1915) (city building inspector could not deny a building permit
for a store simply because there were no other stores in the area) (recognizing that the police
power cannot be used to merely improve the aesthetic appearance of a neighborhood).
Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 98 A. 547, 549 (Md.1916) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance
prohibiting the erection of new dwelling houses unless they are constructed as separate
buildings) (“The act does not relate to the police power, and its enforcement would deprive the
appellee of property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which cannot be invaded for purely
aesthetic purposes under the guise of the police power.”).
Osborne v. Grauel, 110 A. 199 (Md.1920) (upholding the denial of a permit to construct a garage
nearby to residences and recognizing that garages “increase the danger of fire”) (but noting that
the police power cannot be used for solely aesthetic purposes).
Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50 (Md.1925) (extensively documenting the contemporary state of
zoning law) (holding that ordinances that bear no relation to public health, safety, morals, or
welfare are void) (holding that aesthetic concerns alone cannot justify the exercise of the police
power and the infringement of property rights).
R.B. Const. Co. v. Jackson, 137 A. 278 (Md.1927) (upholding zoning ordinances establishing
setback requirements, because they tend to reduce the risk of fire and promote health).
Nw. Merchs. Terminal v. O’Rourke, 60 A.2d 774 (Md.1948) (private action by taxpayers to
enforce zoning ordinance with regard to neighboring property) (“In order to impose restrictions
some valid exercise of the police power must be proven. But such power is invoked for the
protection of the property restricted and not to give protection to surrounding property.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Maryland Advertising Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 86 A.2d 169 (Md.1952) (finding that a
restriction on billboards was not related to public health, safety, morals, or welfare and,
therefore, was arbitrary and invalid).
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Massachusetts
Welch v. Swasey, 79 N.E. 745 (Mass. 1907) (finding restrictions on maximum building heights
valid, because they promote public safety from fire) (but noting that such ordinances cannot be
upheld “for a mere aesthetic object”).
In re Op. of the Justices, 127 N.E. 525 (Mass.1920) (opining that zoning on the basis of land use
is a valid exercise of the police power to promote public health and safety) (but noting that
aesthetic considerations alone cannot serve as the basis of the police power).
Ayer v. Cram, 136 N.E. 338 (Mass.1922) (upholding maximum height restrictions, because they
could diminish the risk of fire) (but noting that use of the police power cannot be based on
aesthetic considerations alone).
Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Mass.1935) (discussing
constitutional provision allowing regulation of billboards along public ways) (holding that such
regulations are valid, because they “promote safety of travel upon the highways”) (aesthetic
considerations alone do not justify use of police power).
Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 3 N.E.2d 19 (Mass.1936) (prohibition of commercial signs in a
residential zone) (noting that “doubtless esthetic considerations play a large part” in the
prohibition of such advertisements; however, reaching the holding based on the separation of
land uses and the promotion of public health, safety, and welfare).
Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 61 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.1945) (town by law restraining the removal
of top soil) (noting that aesthetics may be considered in conjunction with other considerations).
122 Main St. Corp. v. City of Brockton, 84 N.E.2d 13 (Mass.1949) (“It is not within the scope of
the act to enact zoning regulations for the purpose of assisting a municipality to retain or assume
a general appearance deemed to be ideal, or to inflate its taxable revenue.”).
Circle Lounge & Grill v. Bd. of Appeal, 86 N.E.2d 920 (Mass.1949) (private action to prevent
the issuance of a permit to construct a restaurant on nearby land).
Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9 (Mass.1949) (“Regard for the preservation
of the natural beauty of a neighborhood makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but
does not itself give vitality to the regulation.”).
Michigan
James S. Holden Co. v. Connor, 241 N.W. 915 (Mich. 1932) (upholding an ordinance
establishing setbacks on public health and safety grounds) (but noting that aesthetic
considerations alone cannot justify the police power).
Perry Mount Park Cemetery Ass’n v. Netzel, 264 N.W. 303 (Mich.1936) (private action to
enjoin the operation of a salvage yard on unrestricted neighboring land) (“[M]ere esthetics is
beyond the power of the court to regulate, especially in a case like this where both parties are in
business for profit.”).

iv

Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 271 N.W. 823 (Mich.1937) (holding that a
prohibition of billboards that “did not at all interfere with any highway use or view” was invalid)
(“Esthetics may be an incident but cannot be the moving factor.”).
Senefsky v. Lawler, 12 N.W.2d 788 (Mich.1943) (holding that minimum lot size requirements
are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot serve as the
basis of the police power).
1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 20 N.W.2d 217 (Mich.1945) (upholding the prohibition of
signs overhanging public rights of way) (noting that cities may choose how to regulate, improve,
and control its streets) (distinguishing invalid regulations pertaining to signs on private property).
Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 24 N.W.2d 209 (Mich.1946) (holding that minimum lot size
requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot
serve as the basis of the police power).
Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Twp., 26 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 1947) (holding that minimum
lot size requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone
cannot serve as the basis of the police power).
Hitchman v. Oakland Twp., 45 N.W.2d 306 (Mich.1951) (holding that minimum lot size
requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot
serve as the basis of the police power).
Foster v. Genesee Cnty., 46 N.W.2d 426 (Mich.1951) (dismissing a complaint to enjoin the
construction of an animal shelter under the theory that it could constitute a nuisance in the
future).
Missouri
City of St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8 (Mo. 1903) (upholding an ordinance requiring the removal
of flowers considered to be “weeds,” because weeds tend to disrupt the public health).
City of St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998 (Mo.1910) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting
the operation of manufacturing machinery within six hundred feet of a park was unconstitutional
as a taking without compensation) (“[The police power] cannot sanction the confiscation of
private property for aesthetic purposes.”).
In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (upholding an
ordinance that regulated the construction and setback of structures, but that provided
compensation for the ensuing diminution in value) (generally analogizing the restrictions at issue
to height restrictions that tend to protect public safety and comfort).
State ex rel Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (holding that
zoning ordinances that bear no relation to public health, safety, or welfare are void and
unconstitutional) (noting that the police power cannot be used for purely aesthetic purposes)
(“[T]he necessity for the existence of civil government lies in the protection it affords to the
rights of the individual.”).

v

City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (holding that zoning ordinances
that bear no relation to public health, safety, or welfare are void and unconstitutional) (finding
that the police power may not rest on aesthetic considerations alone).
State ex rel Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 720 (Mo.1927) (en banc) (upholding a
zoning ordinance that segregated land uses, because it promoted public health and safety).
Blind v. Brockman, 12 S.W.2d 742 (Mo.1928)(upholding prohibition on soft drink stands for
public safety reasons) (distinguishing cases that involve the use of the police power for purely
aesthetic purposes).
City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475 (Mo.1948) (upholding an ordinance that
prohibited junk yards in an industrial zone).
Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, Inc., 257 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.1953) (private action to enjoin
operation of funeral home in allegedly residential district) (remanded to determine whether
district was in fact zoned as business or for funeral homes).
New Hampshire
Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 A. 142 (N.H. 1928) (noting that aesthetics alone cannot justify the use of
the police power, but upholding a set back ordinance on the basis of public health and safety).
New Mexico
Town of Gallup v. Constant, 11 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1932) (affirming the grant of an injunction to
restrain construction and compel removal of wooden structures within fire limits) (ordinance
upheld on public safety grounds).
New York
Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1925) (upholding ordinances establishing setbacks and
maximum heights on public health and safety grounds) (noting that aesthetics may be considered
as auxiliary to more sufficient justifications for police power activity).
Eaton v. Sweeny, 177 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1931) (the burdens of zoning “must be equally
distributed”) (city cannot use zoning to beautify property adjacent to a park if such zoning
renders property valueless).
Dowsey v. Vill. of Kensington, 177 N.E. 427 (N.Y. 1931) (declaring invalid an ordinance
eneacted with apparently the sole objective of beautifying the village frontage).
Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5 (N.Y. 1932) (upholding the administrative act of a state officer
regarding the construction of a highway that blocked the view of certain billboards)
(distinguishing laws that regulate billboards on private property).
vi

Mid-State Adver. Corp. v. Bond, 8 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1937) (noting that an ordinance prohibiting
the construction of off-site advertising billboards anywhere within city limits was void) (the
court did not decide this case on aesthetic grounds).
Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 18 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1938) (upholding ordinance that divided
land uses by prohibiting boarding house in single family residential zone ) (noting that
ordinances compelling obedience to restrictive covenants in deeds are valid, even if they involve
incidental aesthetic considerations) (noting that aesthetic considerations are not “wholly without
weight”).
North Carolina
Turner v. City of New Bern, 122 S.E. 469 (N.C. 1924) (holding that the police power can be
used to prohibit the operation of certain businesses in certain districts) (noting that a locality
cannot use the police power for purely aesthetic purposes without paying just compensation).
MacRae v. City of Fayetteville, 150 S.E. 810 (N.C. 1929) (“[A gasoline station] might be to
some an ‘eyesore,’ but the law does not allow aesthetic taste to control private property, under
the guide of police power.”).
Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 154 S.E. 29 (N.C. 1930) (finding that a filling station may be
prohibited in residential zones, because of the “possibility of public injury”).
Appeal of Parker, 197 S.E. 706 (N.C. 1938) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting walls along the
street line on the basis of public safety).
Pennsylvania
Appeal of White, 134 A. 409 (Pa. 1926) (holding that certain setback requirements were invalid,
because they were unrelated to public safety, health, morals, or general welfare) (“[Regulation of
private property] must not be from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic
laws or for purely aesthetic considerations.”).
Appeal of Ward, 137 A. 630 (Pa.1927) (upholding zoning ordinance providing for the separation
of business and residential uses).
Appeal of Ligget, 139 A. 619 (Pa.1927) (upholding the exclusion of advertising signboards from
residential districts) (but noting that zoning regulations cannot be justified by solely aesthetic
considerations) (but noting that zoning may not be sustained on aesthetic considerations alone).
Appeal of Kerr, 144 A. 81 (Pa.1928) (upholding setback restrictions related to public health,
safety, morals, or welfare).
Walnut & Quince Streets Corp. v. Mills, 154 A. 29 (Pa.1931) (finding that a city may use
aesthetic considerations in municipal control over public property) (analogizing the municipal
determination of what signs private parties may place on public property to the municipal choice
of what trees to plant in public parks).
vii

Walker v. Delaware Cnty. Trust Co., 171 A. 458 (Pa.1934) (denying an injunction to prohibit the
operation of a gas station in a commercial zone, because the use does not constitute a nuisance).
Petition of Standard Investments Corp., 19 A.2d 167 (Pa.1941) (finding that to be valid
ordinances must not be based arbitrarily on aesthetic considerations).
Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 40 A.2d 423 (Pa.1945) (upholding the
grant of a permit to operate a rabbi’s office and synagogue in a residential zone that also
expressly allowed the operation of church and church offices).
Application of Devereux Foundation, 41 A.2d 744 (Pa.1945) (overturning a variance to operate a
home for mentally deficient children in a residential zone, because petitioner did not provide
enough evidence to support the grant of a variance).
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277 (Pa.1947) (upholding redevelopment law that
allowed private parties to invest in public projects in redevelopment areas acquired by eminent
domain) (noting in passing that “aesthetic objectives are not sufficient to justify the exercise of
the power of eminent domain”).
Appeal of Crawford, 57 A.2d 862 (Pa.1948) (Board of Adjustment abused discretion by refusing
to grant variance for setback requirements).
Katzman v. Anderson, 59 A.2d 85 (Pa.1948) (refusing to enforce a deed restriction that had
become impractical due to changing conditions).
Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533 (Pa.1951) (declaring that a zoning board may not deny a permit
simply because it finds the intended use to be unaesthetic).
Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118 (Pa.1954) (declaring that aesthetic reasons alone cannot
justify use of the police power and invalidating an ordinance establishing minimum lot sizes).
La Rue v. Weiser, 106 A.2d 447 (Pa.1954) (refusing to enforce a sixty-three year old deed
restriction that had become impractical due to changed neighborhood conditions).
Silverco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 109 A.2d 147 (Pa.1954) (upholding denial of
variance to operate live cattle and hide storage business in an industrial district, because
petitioner did not sustain his burden of evidence).
Rhode Island
City of Providence v. Stephens, 133 A. 614 (R.I. 1926) (finding that apartment homes may be
excluded from a residential district on the grounds that the exclusion would promote public
health and safety by lessening the risks of fire and congestion) (but noting that the police power
cannot be based on purely aesthetic considerations).
Sundlun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 145 A. 451 (R.I.1929) (finding that a city acted improperly in
denying a permit to erect a filling station in a residential district, because the record did not
indicate that the station was a threat to public health or safety) (noting that mere aesthetic
objections to the station could not justify denial of the permit).
Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming & Funeral Directing, 182 A. 808 (R.I. 1936)
(statute setting requirements for licensure of undertaking businesses).
viii

Nutini v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 82 A.2d 883 (R.I.1951) (affirming action of zoning board
granting permit to operate a dental office in a residential zone).
Vermont
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Vill. of St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188 (Vt. 1943) (finding that zoning
ordinances could not be used to prohibit the operation of junk yards for purely aesthetic reasons).
Virginia
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 67 S.E. 376 (Va. 1910) (finding that setback requirements are not
unconstitutional, because they serve “the interest of public health, public morals, and public
safety”).
Gorieb v. Fox, 134 S.E. 914 (Va.1926) (noting the unsettled extent of the police power) (finding
that ordinances separating land use and establishing setbacks are valid “if passed in the interest
of the health, safety, comfort, or convenience of the public, or for the promotion of the public
welfare, when not unreasonable”).
Martin v. City of Danville, 138 S.E. 629 (Va.1927) (upholding an ordinance regulating the
location of filling stations) (displaying deference to legislative determinations and noting that
because the ordinance was not “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,” it was not unconstitutional).
West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 192 S.E. 881 (Va.1937) (upholding a prohibition on
brick plants in a residential district, but noting that aesthetic considerations alone cannot justify
use of the police power).
City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 1 S.E.2d 296 (Va.1939) (holding that ordinances must relate to
public health, safety, morals, or welfare).
Washington
State ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 256 P. 781 (Wash. 1927) (upholding single family
residential districts that only allow construction of philanthropic homes for children or the
elderly when two thrids of nearby property owners consent).
King Cnty. v. Lunn, 200 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1948) (injunction to prohibit individual form operating
a restaurant out of his home in a residential district).

ix

Summary
State High Court

Based on the cases identified, prior to Berman, could aesthetics alone serve
as the justification for exercise of the police power?

Arkansas

No

California

No

Connecticut

No

Kansas

No

Louisiana

Probably not, however, economic considerations together with a preservation
objective would likely have been valid

Maine

-

Maryland

No

Massachusetts

No

Michigan

No

Missouri

No

New Hampshire

No

New Mexico

-

New York

No

North Carolina

No

Pennsylvania

No

Rhode Island

No

Vermont

No

Virginia

No

Washington

-

x

Appendix B
Table of Cases, decided after Berman v. Parker but before Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, for the nineteen states identified
Arkansas
Yarbrough v. Arkansas State Highway Comm’n, 539 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1976) (delegation of
authority to State Highway Commission to enter into agreements with the United States
Secretary of Transportation).
Quapaw Quarter Ass'n Inc. v. City of Little Rock Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 546 S.W.2d 427
(Ark. 1977) (holding that a city ordinance could not be repealed or altered by a resolution).
California
Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (application
of the California Environmental Quality Act to the annexation of land to the locality).
Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 542 P.2d 645 (Cal.
1975) (en banc) (exemption of locality from the requirements of the Coastal Zone Conservation
Act).
Connecticut
City of New Haven v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 A.2d 563 (Conn. 1974) (standing to appeal
Public Utilities Commission’s authorization for constructing overhead power lines).
Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 368 A.2d 163 (Conn. 1976) (finding that “public welfare”
includes the preservation of historic areas).
Kansas
Bd. of Park Comm’rs v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 480 P.2d 81 (Kan. 1971) (exemption of certain
city property from ad valorem taxes by county).

xi

Louisiana
Probst v. City of New Orleans, 337 So.2d 1081 (La. 1976) (suit to recover ad valorem taxes paid
under protest due to contested assessments).
Maine
Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 381 A.2d 643 (Me. 1978) (vested rights in a rezoning case).
Maryland
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 253 A.2d 883 (Md. 1969) (sufficiency of evidence needed to
grant a special exception to a county zoning ordinance).
People’s Counsel, Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 270 A.2d 105 (Md.1970)
(necessity to obtain a certificate from the Public Service Commission prior to constructing an
generating station).
City of Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144 (Md.1970) (noting that
aesthetics alone could not justify the use of the police power to restrict the erection of billboards
or painted signs).
Mayor of Balitmore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828 (Md.1973) (“[T]he police power may
rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is generally regarded by the public to be pleasing
to the eye or historically or architecturally significant.”).
Trainer v. Lipchin, 309 A.2d 471 (Md.1973) (finding that rezoning was not available for a
petitioner who was not deprived of all reasonable use of his property as presently zoned).
Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 316 A.2d 807 (Md.1974) (city sought to enjoin
county from demolishing county structure located in historic district).
Massachusetts
Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955) (finding that the police power
could be used to preserve historic districts).
Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (finding that the police power
could be used to preserve historic districts).
Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass.1962)
(discriminatory rental practices).
McNeely v. Bd. of Appeal, 261 N.E.2d 336 (Mass.1970) (sufficiency of evidence to grant a
variance).
xii

John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass.1975)(declaring that
the general welfare includes aesthetic considerations).
Gumley v. Bd. of Selectmen, 358 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass.1977) (discussing the considerations and
procedures that a historic district commission must follow when issuing a certificate of
appropriateness) (case does not involve a challenge to the historic zoning ordinance).
Island Props., Inc. v. Martha’s Vineyard Comm’n, 361 N.E.2d 385 (Mass.1977) (application of
regulatory controls in land and water protection act to subdivision plans previously approved).
Michigan
Petition of Highway US-24, in Bloomfield Twp., Oakland Cnty., 220 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1974)
(highway condemnation proceeding).
Sabo v. Twp. of Monroe, 232 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1975) (finding that the construction of a
mobile-home park on residentially zoned land was reasonable) (finding that otherwise valid
zoning regulations are not invalid because they were enacted prior to the adoption of a master
plan).
Missouri
City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (upholding a zoning ordinance that
served to preserve the character and distinction of a neighborhood, but that provided
compensation for the ensuing diminution in value).
New Hampshire
Town of Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232 (N.H. 1964) (holding that
historic zoning is within the scope of the police power).
New Mexico
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964) (holding that historic zoning
is within the scope of the police power).

xiii

New York
Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that the
denial of all economically viable use of a property constitutes a taking).
Conley v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 353 N.E.2d 594 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding
the issuance of a variance to subdivide a parcel).
Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977) (action against city and state officials to issue
permits to develop sewer system and connections).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding the
New York Landmark Ordinance).
North Carolina
Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971) (holding that rezoning is not valid when it
is based only on “special arrangements” with the owner of a particular parcel).
Pennsylvania
Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 141 A.2d 606 (Pa. 1958) (noting that a
community can regulate property to create a more attractive environment).
Nat’l Land & Inv.Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (noting that aesthetics alone cannot
justify the use of the police power).
Shapp v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (noting that a new
state constitutional provision granted Pennsylvania the authority “to act in areas of purely
aesthetic or historical concern).
Rhode Island
Hayes v. Smith, 167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961) (finding that the zoning board of review was justified
in reversing a decision of the historic district commission) (case does not involve a challenge to
the historic zoning ordinance).
Op. to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1965) (finding that a statute delegating
authority to provide for historic zoning is likely constitutional). This opinion did not contain a
discussion as to why the statute was constitutional, because the court determined that it did not
have authority to issue an advisory opinion on this matter. See id.
Boggs v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 264 A.2d 923 (R.I. 1970) (discussing procedural,
advertisement, and notice requirements for appeals taken to the zoning board of review).
xiv

Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 370 A.2d 226 (R.I. 1977) (discussing the
procedural and appraisal aspects of condemnation).
Vermont
In re Barker Sargent Corp., 313 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1973) (finding that a sanitary landfill would not
result in pollution in violation of environmental law).
Virginia
Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (Va. 1975) (invalidating certain architectural
design review regulations) (finding that a locality cannot use the police power fore solely
aesthetic considerations) (recognizing that the Virginia Code did authorize certain localities to
adopt historic districts under certain restrictions).
Virginia Historic Landmarks Comm’n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 230 S.E.2d 449 (Va. 1976) (finding
that the State Historic Landmark Commission’s designation of a historic district for the Virginia
Landmarks Register was not subject to judicial review).
Washington
Leschi Imp. Council v. Washington State Highway Comm’n, 525 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1974) (en
banc) (environmental impact of highways).
Swift v. Island Cnty., 552 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1976) (environmental impact of subdivision
development).
Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (finding,
in an environmental law context, that the police power can be used to protect aesthetics when it
also served to protect against economic loss).
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Summary
State High Court

Based on the cases identified, following Berman, could aesthetics or historic
concerns alone serve as the justification for exercise of the police power?

Arkansas

-

California

-

Connecticut

Passed on the issue of solely aesthetic regulations, but upheld the validity of
a historic district ordinance and recognized a broad scope of the general
welfare

Kansas

-

Louisiana

-

Maine

-

Maryland

Where regulations sought to create aesthetically pleasing results, rather than
to preserve or protect something which is aesthetically pleasing, the
regulations will be invalid.

Massachusetts

Yes

Michigan

-

Missouri

-

New Hampshire

Yes

New Mexico

Yes

New York

Passed on the issue of aesthetics, because the primary issue in the case was
as applied confiscatory takings; however, the dissent discussed how it may
be appropriate to adopt the position that aesthetics alone is enough

North Carolina

-

Pennsylvania

Strongly mixed decisions recognizing the validity of aesthetic and historic
zoning, but still holding that aesthetics alone cannot justify use of the police
power

Rhode Island

-

Vermont

-

Virginia

No, aesthetics alone are not enough; however, the court noted that design
regulations would have been valid if they were in compliance with the Code
of Virginia

Washington

Aesthetics considerations will suffice if the ordinance also protects against
economic loss
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